



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





31.

1/2





229.4
G 89

THE TOPOGRAPHY
OF THE
BATTLE OF PLATÆA:

THE CITY OF PLATÆA.

THE FIELD OF LEUCTRA.

BY G. B. GRUNDY, B.A.
Head Master of the Oxford Military College.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1894.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

Neat - Ave.
Blackwell
3-14-27
15350
0
2
2
1
1
0

P R E F A C E .

THIS paper is a report of the results of a journey undertaken by me to Boeotia in December 1892 and January 1893 as holder of the studentship of Geography founded at Oxford by the Royal Geographical Society and the University jointly.

It was originally prepared, as its form will show, with a view to its being read as a paper at one of the meetings of the Society. I found, however, that it would be impossible, without sacrificing the necessary closeness of the argument, to bring the matter within the compass of such a paper as could be read *viva voce*.

I have throughout this paper confined myself almost entirely to the use of the first person, because I feel that were I to have adopted the impersonal "it" I should have seemed thereby to claim a general authority for statements and conjectures which are purely my own and founded on my own observation.

The selection of Boeotia as a field of work was due to the suggestion of Mr. R. W. Macan, of University College, Oxford, Reader in Ancient History, to whom I owe a further debt of gratitude for having, with his usual kindness, read through this paper in its MS. form, and for having helped me by criticising certain details contained in it.

The practical difficulties which I should have experienced in making arrangements for my journey after arriving in Athens were entirely removed by the kind help of Mr. Ernest Gardner, Principal of the British Archæological School at Athens.

G. B. GRUNDY.

BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD. |

CONTENTS.

I. THE BATTLEFIELD OF PLATÆA.

	<i>PAGE</i>
Limits of Battlefield of Platæa	1
General Description of Field of Platæa	2
Difficulty in Understanding Herodotus' Account	3
Present State of Field as compared with State at Time of the Battle	4
The Passes from Attica to Boeotia	5
Tombs of those Greeks who fell in the Battle	8
Herodotus' Description of the Ground	8
Essential Points in his Narrative	9
The First Position of the Greeks	9
Site of Erythræ	9
The Action in the First Position	12
The Persian Camp	13
Site of Scolus	13
Road from Platæa to Thebes	14
The Second Position of the Greeks	15
Site of Hysie	15
The Spring of Gargaphia	16
The Temenos of the Hero Androcrates	17
The Asopus River of Herodotus	18
The Second Position of the Greeks had Three Developments	19
Second Position, Second Development	19
Second Position, Third Development	20
The Three Developments Summarised	21
The Strategy of the Greek Generals	22
Herodotus' Sources of Information	22
The Movement to the Island	22
Position of the Island	23
Its Position as Determined by Vischer and Leake	23
The Great Fight	31
The Great Fight: Spartans and Persians	31
The Temple of Eleusinian Demeter	32
Movement of the Spartans	32
The River Moloeis	33
The Argiopian Country	33
Position of Temple of Eleusinian Demeter	33
The Retrograde Movement of the Spartans	35
Persians Advance and Attack Spartans	35
Persian Line of Flight	38
Detail affecting Position of Temple of Demeter	38
The Movement of the Athenians	38
Attack of Medised Greeks on Athenians	39
Line of Boeotian Flight	39

CONTENTS.

II. THE CITY OF PLATEA.

III. THE FIELD OF LEUCTRA.

The Difficulties with regard to the Accounts of the Battle	73
General Description of the Field	73
March of Cleombrotus	74
Point in Strategical Geography of Boeotia	74
Strategical Similarity of Boeotia and North Italy	74
Theban Position at Leuctra	75
The Trophy	75
Spartan Position	75

MAPS.

Plans of the Battlefields of Plataea and Leuctra	76
Map showing whole of Site of Plataea	76
Plan of Ruins of Northern Portion of Plataea	76

I.—THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA.

BEFORE entering upon any discussion as to the details of the battle given by Herodotus, it will be well to give a general description of the field, and to make an attempt also to determine the position of the various points thereon which are expressly mentioned by ~~the former~~. It is not difficult, perhaps, to lay down the limits within which the actual fighting took place. The boundary on the north side is the River Asopus. On the south it is, judging from Herodotus' description, the boundary of the rocky foot of Kithæron, *i.e.*, the line dividing the uncultivated mountain slope, which is, and must always have been, impracticable for cavalry, from the rolling plough or vine land of the plain. It is probable that the limit of cultivation remains, save in one important particular, to be hereafter mentioned, much the same as in former times. Two considerations support this view strongly, I consider—

(1) The cultivation has certainly *not* receded. It is at the present day carried to the very edge of ground consisting for the most part of bare rock or closely-packed boulder stones, with but scanty soil in between them. This land shows no sign of ever having been cultivated, and does not appear to admit or to ever have admitted of cultivation.

(2) The cultivation has probably not advanced greatly, save only in one part above excepted. The ground at present cultivated does not provide much more than is sufficient for the needs of the present population. A little wine goes away elsewhere, but, from what I learnt by enquiry, but little food produce can be spared for exportation, and the vine lands form a very small portion of the area under cultivation. Now we know that the Platæans could put one thousand fighting men into the field at the time of Marathon. The present population of Kriekouki and Kokla, the only places of habitation on the field, could not furnish

half that number of able-bodied men, since their total population does not amount to more than two thousand five hundred, all told. This would seem to point to the probability that the area then under cultivation was as extensive, or at any rate very nearly as extensive, as at the present day. I have touched upon this point at some length, because I think that anyone who reads the account of Herodotus must see that this line of demarcation between the cultivated and uncultivated ground, between, that is to say, the ground on which cavalry could act and that on which they could not act, is a most important factor in the battle.

If, then, as seems to me probable, the line of demarcation at the present day may be taken as corresponding closely with that at the time of the battle, the extent of the field from north to south is a trifle over three miles in average breadth. I have shown the demarcation by a zigzag line upon the map.

General description of the ground. > South of this line rises the steep rocky slope of Kithæron. It will be noticed on reference to the map that at the south-east corner of it the mountain throws out a great bastion or series of bastions into the plain, which project much farther towards the north than any other portion of Kithæron of similar height within the extent of the battle-field.

> The extent of the field from east to west is a little over 4 miles, measured from a line running north to south about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile east of the direct road from Druoskephalæ to Thebes to the west extremity of the ruins of Platæa.

Now this field of the actual fighting may very well be divided into two parts. The south portion of it along the foot of Kithæron consists of ridges running south to north divided from one another by stream valleys, spurs in fact of the great mountain, but of no great height. These ridges I have numbered for convenience of reference 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Of these No. 1 is much loftier than the others. No. 5 is, it must be noticed, much lower than Nos. 4 and 6; it is also broad, consequently No. 6, i.e. the site of Platæa, stands out high when viewed from No. 4 and *vice versa*.

North of these ridges it will be noticed that a distinct line of depression extends across the field from east to west, roughly speaking, running up the Kriekouki Brook (A6) to the bottom of the village from north-east to south-west, and from there to the head-waters of the brook marked A 1 (i.e. first brook flowing into Asopus) in a north-west direction. There it joins the flat plain which extends from Platæa itself to the Asopus River. This plain is the *only* flat land in the whole battle-field. Besides this flat

plain there lie north of this line of depression three ridges or hills which I have marked as Asopus Ridge, the Long Ridge, and the Plateau. These names are merely used for purposes of distinction; I could not find that the ridges were distinguished locally by any names at all. Such then is the general description of the field. For the benefit of those who would further wish to picture it to their imagination I may give the following excellent recipe. Take a piece of the Wantage or Newbury downs, 3 miles by 4, and all plough land, and on one of the longer sides thereof place the Rigi as viewed from the Lake of Zug; that will give a very fair idea of the land of Platea. Be careful to eliminate the chalk. Now all this sounds simple enough in a general description, yet I have no hesitation in saying that I have never seen any battle-field (and I have in an amateur sort of way examined several dozens of battle-fields in various parts of Europe) which presents anything like the difficulties presented by the field of Platea. I am not referring to historical difficulties—what I mean is this, that the ground is so intensely complicated in contour, and distances and levels are so immensely distorted by the great overhanging mass of Kithæron, that it requires a week's hard walking to take in all the details which must be grasped in order to be able to form a capable judgment of the events which are narrated as having taken place upon it. I am not ashamed to confess that when I had been on the field three days, I thought I knew the ground off by heart. After I had been there a week I found that I was only beginning to know it, and it was not until I had surveyed the whole of it, and had been over the important parts of it twice, or in some cases three times, after, that is, I had walked some 200 miles over its area, that I fully recognised how exceedingly erroneous was the impression I had formed at the end of the first three days. I cannot discover that any enquirer has previously spent a fortnight in tramping over that heavy plough, where the walker was never less than ankle deep and very often knee-deep in mud, or along those tracks which are worse than the plough, or in wading ankle-deep in the water of the streams, whose beds, during the greater part of the time I was on the ground, formed the most desirable and the quickest path. This last fact is absolutely literal; anyone who has visited Parasopia in the rain, sleet and snow of winter will be able to vouch for its correctness.

Such then are the difficulties which face anyone who would understand the field of Platea. I cannot but think that, although the historical details connected with the battle do and must always

offer difficulties which are not now capable of exact solution, yet that many of the most serious difficulties which have been raised by commentators with respect to the accounts of the battle as given by Herodotus especially, are due in a great measure to the fact that the commentators themselves, or the authorities from which they drew their information, had seen just enough of the ground to arrive at the happy frame of mind with regard to it in which I found myself at the end of the first three days.

State of ground at present day as compared with say, of capital importance with regard to the matter in hand; the its state at the time of the battle.

Before proceeding to more detailed discussion as to the ground, there is a general question to touch upon, which is, I need hardly forming a natural but erroneous conclusion. I noticed in the other parts of Greece through which I passed, especially *e.g.* on the north coast of the Morea, and, though not perhaps so markedly, in Attica, that the stream beds showed evident and unmistakable signs by their width of the fact that watercourses, which are for the major part of the year either dry, or only traversed by trickling streams, are at times filled by raging torrents, in some cases one or two hundred yards broad. It need hardly be added that the changes produced in the configuration of the country by such streams are both rapid and great. Now in Upper Parasopia such torrents do not exist. I do not think that the cause is to be found in a less annual rainfall; probably the yearly rainfall in Bœotia is greater than that in the major part of Greece. Nor do I think it is due to a more evenly distributed rainfall, *i.e.* a local absence in Upper Parasopia of those torrential cloud-bursts by which other parts of Greece are at times visited. I experienced several of them during my stay in Kriekouki on the field of Platea; still it is a fact that though I was out in them and immediately after them, I never had the slightest difficulty in crossing any of the streams; it was not even necessary to get wet in so doing. On one occasion also I happened to be following the course of one of the watercourses leading to the Oeroe amid a downpour of rain such as we rarely ever see in England, and which had been going on with more or less continuity for the previous fourteen hours; and yet, as I descended the brook towards the plain, the water became less and less, until, when I arrived on the plain, the bed of the stream

was dry. The cause is to be sought, I think, in the peculiar nature of the soil itself, and, possibly in the existence of underground watercourses. The soil appears to have a peculiar capacity for absorbing rain, which remains, however, for the most part, near the surface. In many places too, the land after heavy rain is dotted with holes from 3 to 6 inches in diameter at the surface, but considerably wider lower down, with a depth of from 1 foot to 30 inches. These are evidently sinks where the ground has fallen in over small cavities formed beneath the surface by the water from the rains. In the flat plain between Platæa and the Asopus River, it can hardly be doubted that the *courses* of the various streams which traverse it are liable to alteration, but I do not think that it is probable that the *characteristics* of the stream beds as to width, depth, etc., are at all likely to be different now from what they were 2000 years ago. I mention this point with emphasis because it will be seen, I think, that this consideration has a most important bearing on the position of the *vŷros* mentioned by Herodotus.

My general conclusion is, therefore, that the surface of the country has changed but little since the time of the battle.

It is worthy of note that in the account given by Herodotus of the passes from Attica to Boeotia. ^{The passes} the battle only two passes through the ridge of Kithæron are mentioned, of which one debouches on the rolling plain of Parasopia many miles east of the actual battle-field. Concerning this pass Herodotus says that Mardonius hearing that the Greeks were gathered at the Isthmus, retreated into Boeotia διὰ Δεκελέης,* and was then conducted by Boeotian guides ἐς Σφεδαλέας, ἐνθεύτεν δὲ ἐς Τανάγρην. From thence he went to Σκῦλος, where he was ἐν γῇ τῇ Θηβαίων. There is no difficulty in identifying this pass with that pass which is in use at the present day, and through which many who have visited Boeotia must have entered or left the country, the pass, I mean, which traverses the east shoulder of Parnes by way of the modern Tatoi, and from which the road leads to Asopus. Probably he turned off to the left immediately after crossing the pass down a stream valley which joins the Asopus near Tanagra.

What is, however, remarkable in Herodotus' account of the battle is that he only makes mention by name of one of the three passes (that of Δρυὸς κεφαλαῖ) which lead over Kithæron directly on to the field. Of these three the position and characteristics of the pass he does mention are too well known to need much

* Herod. ix. 15.

description. It is on the direct road from Athens to Thebes. From the side of Attica the road enters the pass beneath the hill on which stands the fortress of Eleutheræ. The slope of the road is more gradual on the Attic side of the summit than on the Boëotian. On the latter side it descends the steep slope of the mountain by a series of zigzags which will be seen on the map. I may mention that the summit of the pass is, I should say, from $\frac{1}{4}$ to 1 mile outside the south limit of the map. The direct road to Thebes then passes along the west foot of that lofty bastion of Kithæron of which I have made mention, and just where it enters the plain traverses the east side of what I shall, I hope, be able to show to be the site of the ancient *Ἐρυθραί*. It then goes in a direct line almost due north to the *Ασόπος*. The point where this road debouches on the plain is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of the Acropolis of Platea. A loop of this road, of quite modern date, leaves the main road (v. map) on the mountain side, and after passing through Kriekouki, rejoins it again about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below the village. The part of this new road, however, from the top of this village to the bridge by which it crosses stream A6 at the lower end of the village, is of significance in reference to the Second Pass. This pass is about 1 mile west of the pass of *Δρυὸς κεφαλαί*, i.e., it debouches from the mountain about 2 miles east of Platea. Through it went the road from Athens to Platea, traces of which are plainly visible in the shape of a road cut in the rock, with wheel ruts worn in the rock at a point noted in the map. These traces lead directly into the mouth of this pass, at the exit of which, as I shall try to show later on, lies the possible site of the ancient *Υσιαί*. From this pass too there are traces of an ancient track, corresponding for the most part with a modern one, leading to the road through Kriekouki, and joining it just at the sharp bend above the village. This would seem to have been an alternative route to Thebes from Athens, passing through Hysiae probably, and continuing its course to Thebes along the loop road as far as the bottom of Kriekouki, where it probably left the line of the loop road to pass down the valley of stream A4, along the line of the present track down that stream. It is curious that Herodotus does not mention this pass, because its existence can hardly have failed to determine the movements of the Greeks in the course of the battle. It does, in fact, I think, explain one of the movements, which is attributed by Herodotus to another reason, which he mentions as the sole one, but which was probably only contributory. The pass is, I understand, a com-

paratively easy one, and is in frequent use at the present time. Snow baulked my intention of examining it.

The third pass is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the last, i.e., about $\frac{3}{4}$ to 1 mile east of Platæa. It is the pass through which ran the ancient road from Megara to Platæa. It is hardly used at the present day: must have been always difficult, if not absolutely impracticable, for wheeled vehicles, but quite practicable for infantry. I went farther up it than pass No. 2, but snow prevented my reaching the top of it.

Portions of the roads through these two last passes (Nos. 2 and 3) are mentioned by Pausanias.

Pausanias says that Neocles, the Boeotarch, in his surprise of Platæa in the year 374, led the Thebans οὐ τὴν εὐθείαν ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβῶν τὴν πεδίαδα, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ Υσιὰς ἡγε πρὸς Ἐλευθερῶν τε καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.*

This would seem certainly to imply that he led them from Thebes to the entrance of the pass, where, as I believe, Hysiae stood, and from there along the Athens Platæa road to Platæa. This road passes along the ὑπωρέη of Kithæron, and a force traversing it even in broad daylight would not be in sight of Platæa until within about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile of the walls. This accords with Pausanias' account, who relates that Neocles calculated to arrive at Platæa περὶ μεσοῦσαν τὴν ἡμέραν, and further describes the surprise as having been complete.

Mention of the road from Megara to Platæa through Pass No. 3 is also made by Pausanias. He says: τοῖς δὲ ἐκ Μεγάρων ἰόντοι πηγή τέ ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ καὶ προελθούσιν ὀλίγον πέρα· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀκταιώνος κοίτην.†

The κοίτη Ἀκταιώνος can, I think, be determined with sufficient certainty at the present day. It is a cave, apparently partly artificial, at the top of a low cliff (probably the πέρα) overhanging the sources of the stream O3, and marked in the map. Near the foot of the cliff is an ancient well, the Vergutiani Spring, apparently, of Colonel Leake. If this be correct, the road must have run above the cliff, which would, as a fact, be its natural course. On this road also, says Pausanias,‡ just before you enter Platæa, are the tombs of those who fell in the battle. Now, though no certain traces of the road itself are at this time visible, yet its natural course can be very well determined owing to the nature of the ground, and there are at the point which I have

* Paus. ix. 1. 6.

† Ibid. ix. 2. 5.

marked in the map numerous remains of tombs cut out in the solid rock close to which the Megara road must have passed before entering Platæa. These tombs were pointed out to me by Dr. Nicholas Merethides of Kriekouki, who, besides having a large and accurate acquaintance with the history of his own country, has taken a peculiar interest in all that concerns the field of Platæa. To him I owe much valuable information. Dr. Merethides believes that the tombs discovered do not merely represent the graves of those who fell in the fight, but the probable site also of a cemetery of Platæa which, not unnaturally, grew up round the tombs. Dr. Merethides and myself discussed the battle again and again, and each succeeded, I believe, in making a partial convert of the other, but I could not accept his theory of the events and positions in the battle, since they fail to accord with any known account, and are, I suspect, insensibly coloured by a certain discovery which he has made, of which I shall speak in its proper place.

Herodotus'
account of the
battle.

I will now take the account as given by Herodotus and make an attempt to determine the points mentioned by him, and by so determining them to arrive at as clear an understanding as is now possible of the incidents and positions in the battle, as related by him. Before so doing I wish to say that I did not go out to the field of Platæa with any brief on behalf of Herodotus. My general expectation was that I should after examining the field find it impossible to make the account of Herodotus tally with the ground as we find it at the present day. This impression was, of course, derived from a diligent study of the various commentators on the account which Herodotus gives. Now I can only say that the longer I remained on the ground, and the more I became acquainted with it, the more was the belief forced on my mind that, though there are obvious omissions in Herodotus' account in respect to the reasons given as the causes of certain facts, yet the facts themselves are reasonably reconcilable with the state of the ground as we see it at the present day. When I say "reasonably," I mean this—that there is a very natural difficulty, such as must always exist, in following exactly the description, however clear, of a complicated piece of ground as seen by the eyes of another man. Also, Herodotus was not essentially a military historian. Furthermore, he was not using a language which possessed the wealth of technical vocabulary which is at the service of, say, an English writer of the present day in describing any portion of country; nor have we any reason to suppose that he used a tape or other measure in calculating his

distances. There is reason, I think, to conjecture that Herodotus had seen the ground himself. He does not indeed say so; but, if he had not, he must have got his account of it from some person of accurate observation.

I am not proposing to take the history of the events which led up to the battle, but merely to take the description of the battle itself. I venture to think that the essential points to determine in the narrative are the three positions of the Greek army, which I may describe briefly as—

- (1) The position on the *νηστεύη*.
- (2) The position at the spring of Gargaphia, the *τέμενος* of the Hero Androcrates, and the Asopus.
- (3) The (unattained) position on the *νήσος*.

In order to fix the first position, we must have some idea of the position of *Ἐρυθραί*. The traditional site will be found marked on the map between the high bastion of Kithæron and ridge 1. I do not want to speak too positively, but I think that the evidence in favour of this position is fairly conclusive.

Evidence in favour :

(a) The tradition, which, being secular, not pious, is worthy, perhaps, of some attention.

(b) The position at the mouth of, and commanding, the Boeotian side of the pass of *Δρυὸς κεφαλαί*, correspondent to Eleutheræ at the Attic end of the same.

There is also an ancient *φρούριον* on the bastion of Kithæron (and marked in the map) overhanging the site. How ancient this *φρούριον* may be cannot now be said; but though we may possibly infer that it did not exist at the time of the battle, it is very likely to have been constructed by the inhabitants of Erythræ at a later date as a defence for their end of the pass.

(c) The signs of remains of ancient buildings on the site. Amongst other remains is an ancient well, beside which is a heap of stones, from which heap Dr. Merethides, whom I have mentioned, obtained two stones with inscriptions, which are now in the museum at Thebes, and which show that it was the site of a temple of Eleusinian Demeter. [I shall give reasons for believing that this is not the temple dedicated to that goddess which Herodotus mentions in his account of the battle.]

(d) Pausanias says, *Γῆς δὲ τῆς Πλαταιῶν ἐν τῷ Κιθαιρῶνι ὀλύγον τῆς εὐθείας ἐκτραπεῖσιν ἐς δεξιὰ 'Υσιῶν καὶ Ἐρυθρῶν ἐρείπια ἔστι*,* and

* Paus. ix. 2. 1.

further on he says, referring to the road of which he is speaking, *αὐτῇ μὲν (i.e., ὁδὸς) ἀπ' Ἐλευθερῶν ἐς Πλάταιαν ἔγει.**

Now the road referred to is evidently the road through pass No. 2. The road across the pass joins the road over Druoskephalæ on the Attic side close to Eleutheræ, after passing over Kithæron. The word *ὅλγον* is important, because I think it disposes of that frail piece of evidence which is all that I am able to produce against this site.

The evidence is this:—

(e) In Grote's 'Greece' is a map of the field of Platæa in which Erythræ is placed several miles east of the road through the pass of Druoskephalæ. How many miles east it is not possible to say, for with a certain amount of wisdom no scale has been attached to the map. The same is the case with a map in Arnold's 'Thucydides,' which pretends to show the passes between Bœotia and Attica. The map is by W. Gell; its date 1828. To this latter map a scale is attached, and Erythræ is shown with a note of interrogation. Both maps are incorrect in essential details. I cannot, therefore, look upon the evidence furnished by such maps as worthy of serious attention, nor should I mention them, were they not specimens of the kind of geographical information on which we have had to rely in questions of some importance in Greek History. [There is also a map of Platæa in the Dictionary of Classical Geography. That work would gain by its omission.]

Colonel Leake places Erythræ some distance east of the site to which I refer it. Can anyone, however, suppose that Pausanias would use the expression above quoted, had the ruins of Erythræ lain some $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles away from the nearest point of this road, and hidden from it, moreover, by the great projecting bastion of Kithæron, which is shown at the south-east corner of my map. Col. Leake quotes Thucydides,† who says that the two hundred and twelve fugitives from Platæa first took the Thebes road to put their pursuers off the scent, and then turning *ἡσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδὸν ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς καὶ Υσιὰς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὄρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας.* Meanwhile the pursuers were searching the road along the *ἰππωρέη*.

Now this higher road would lead the pursuers close by where I conjecture Hysiaæ to have been. But surely, it may be said, the fugitives would not have gone to a place close to the road along which they could see the pursuers were searching for them. Quite so, but . . . Thucydides does *not* say they went to either

* Paus. ix. 2. 2.

† Thuc. iii. 24.

place. Had he intended to imply this he would surely have mentioned Hysiae first, and Erythræ second.* As I understand the passage it seems perfectly comprehensible, and in accord with the hypothesis I have put forward with respect to the position of the two places. They, on turning from the Thebes road, took the ^{Pyrgos Hill} _{No. of Platea?} track which now leads from Pyrgos to Kriekouki, i.e., they went in a bee line for those high rugged bastions which are shown at the south-east corner of my map, and crossed the range east of the pass of Druoskephalæ.

I think, however, that Pausanias' words already quoted dispose effectually of this position. He would not describe a place 25 stades away from the road as a *short* distance on the right.

Let us now take the evidence of Herodotus.† The words used with regard to the extent of the Persian camp—ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ Ύσιάς, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταιῆδα γῆν—do not seem to be evidence either for or against the position, save that they show that Erythræ lay east of Hysiae, a fact which is denied by one commentator, though on what evidence I do not know.

(f) Herodotus says that the Greek force after being joined by the Athenians at Eleusis, ὡς ἀρίκοντο τῆς Βοιωτίης ἐς Ἐρυθρας, and found that the βάρβαροι were encamped on the Asopus, φρασθέντες τοῦτο ἀντεάσσοντο ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος.

Now is it conceivable that the Greek force, especially in its then state of feeling with regard to the Persians, would be likely to turn east along Kithæron, leave the pass open, and take up a position with their backs to a part of the range through which there was no passage of retreat. If Erythræ be where I suppose it to be the tale is comprehensible enough.

(g) We learn later that their reason for moving to their second position was the question of water. This accords with the present circumstances of the locality. The streams in that part of the field contain but little water, and at the end of September would be probably dry for the most part.

But furthermore the ground in this neighbourhood accords ^{The first position of the} peculiarly with the description given by Herodotus of the first engagement. I have no doubt in my own mind that the first

* As to the translation of the passage, refer to Jewett's Translation of Thucydides. As to the point I urge in respect of the order of mention, I can appeal to the fact that Thucydides when referring to the actual *course* taken by a body of men, or a fleet, etc., invariably mentions the places *touched at or arrived at* in their geographical order. *Vide* Thuc. ii. 48. 1; ii. 56. 5; ii. 69. 1; iv. 5. 2; vii. 1. 2; vii. 31. 2.

† Herod. ix. 15.

position taken up by the Greeks was on the high bastion of Kithæron, and also on the low ground, *à cheval* across the Thebes road, and possibly also on the slopes of ridge 1. We do not know the numbers present at first. We only know that after a considerable number had come in, from 100,000 to 110,000 Greeks were present, and therefore it is impossible to say what would be the length of the Greek front. That it would be the natural strategic position for them to take up is plain. The bastion and ridge 1 would be unassailable, and only in the flat ground in front of Erythrae would it be possible for the Persian cavalry to assail them, and this only along the right hand or east portion of the low ground, since the left or west portion of the front on the low land would be protected by deep and precipitous stream gullies which are there at this day, and probably existed in similar form at the time of the battle.

Let us now see how this position accords with the account given by Herodotus.* He says that when Mardonius found that the Greeks did not come down into the plain he sent all the cavalry against them. They, the cavalry, *προσέβαλλον κατὰ τέλεα*. (The comparatively narrow front along which the Greek line would be assailable would account for this mode of attack.)

κατὰ συντυχίην δὲ Μεγαρές ἔτυχον ταχθέντες ὃ τὸ ἐπιμαχώσατον ἦν τοῦ χωρίου πατός, καὶ πρόσοδος μάλιστα ταύτη ἐγίνετο τῇ ἵππῳ. (The Megarans were then probably on the low ground where the cavalry attack was possible, and this leads me to believe that the left wing of the Greeks would be on ridge 1, as the Megarans would hardly be likely to be assigned that post of honour, though it did not here coincide with the post of danger.) The Megarans being pressed send a message to the generals of the Greeks requesting assistance.† (Notice in their message the word *μοῦνοι* :) οὐ δυνατοί εἴμεν τὴν Περσέων ἵππον δέκεσθαι μοῦνοι. (Which would seem to point to the fact that almost all, if not all the attack fell on them, as would be the actual case in this position owing to the narrowness of the front exposed.) They threaten to leave their post unless supported or relieved. (The effect of this would have been to cut the Greek army in two, and to give the Persian cavalry a possible, if dangerous, passage up the pass.) Pausanias has a difficulty in getting any other of the Greeks to take their place. (Pointing to what was, owing to the nature of the ground, the extremely safe and comfortable position of the rest of the army.) Finally three hundred picked Athenians under the command of Olympiodorus

* Herod. ix. 20.

† Ib. ix. 21.

undertake the relief.* οὗτοι ἡσαν οἵ τε ὑποδεξάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρέστων Ἑλλήνων ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ταχθέντες, τοὺς τοξότας προσελόμενοι. (This position of the Megarians to which I refer would be exactly in front of what I believe to be the site of Erythræ.) Then comes a further attack of the Persian cavalry, and the incident, told with considerable detail, of the death of Masiſtius. There then seems to have been a general rush of the Persian cavalry, and a fierce fight round the corpse, in which the three hundred Athenians suffered severely. The rest of the Greeks come to their assistance—the Persian cavalry is driven back, and retire two stadia—and after consulting, withdraw to Mardonius. General mourning for Masiſtius in the Persian camp.† οἱ δὲ Ἑλλῆνες ὡς τὴν ἵππον ἐδέξαντο προσβάλλουσαν καὶ δεξάμενοι ὥσπαντο, ἐθάρσησαν πολλῷ μᾶλλον. καὶ πρώτα μὲν ἐς ἀμαξαν ἐσθέντες τὸν νεκρὸν παρὰ τὰς τάξις ἐκόμιζον.

Here we have two facts of importance:—

(1) The Greeks seem for the time being to have lost their fear of the Persian cavalry, and this accounts for the comparatively venturous nature of the second position which they took up.

(2) The body was carried along the Greek front in a waggon. This would not have been possible had they remained on the ὑπωρέη; but a large portion, at any rate, of them had come down to the low ground to assist the Athenians, and along this low ground a waggon could easily be taken,

Before proceeding to discuss the second position of the Greeks, The Persian
an attempt must be made to locate as nearly as possible the camp.
position of the Persian camp. Herodotus says,‡ παρῆκε δὲ αὐτὸν (Mardonius) τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ Υσιάς, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταιάδα γῆν, παρὰ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν ποταμὸν τεταγμένον. οὐ μέντοι τό γε τεῖχος τοσοῦτο ἐποιέστο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ δέκα σταδίους μάλιστά καὶ μέτωπον ἔκαστον.

Earlier in the same chapter he speaks of the Persian force as having arrived at Σκάλος, ἐν γῇ τῇ Θηβαίων.

I could not find any traces of the ruins of Scolus. Pausanias describes its position with a certain amount of accuracy.§ He says that on the road from Platæa to Thebes, πρὶν δὲ ἡ διαβῆναι τὸν Ἀσωπόν, παρ' αὐτὸν τὸ ρένμα ἀπογραπέσιν ἐς τὰ κάτω καὶ προελθόντιν δοσον τεσσαράκοντα στάδια ἔστιν ἐρείπια Σκάλου. Δήμητρος δὲ καὶ Κόρης ἐν τοῖς ἐρειπίοις οὐκ ἐξεργασμένος ὁ ναός, ἡμίσεα δὲ καὶ τὰς θεαῖς ἔστι

* Herod. ix. 22.

† Ib. ix. 25.

‡ Ib. ix. 15.

§ Paus. ix. 4. 3.

τὰ ἀγάλματα. ἀποκρίνει δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θηβαίων τὴν Πλαταιᾶδα ὁ Ἀσωπός.

Now we see from Herodotus that Scolus was in Theban territory. Pausanias from this tells us that it was on, or at any rate near, the Asopus. It must have lain, therefore, on the north side of that stream. Furthermore, Pausanias says that it was about 40 stades, *i.e.*, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{3}{4}$ miles below the point where the road from Platæa to Thebes crossed the Asopus River. Now it is not possible, at the present day, I think, to say exactly at what point the road from Platæa to Thebes did cross the Asopus, but it may be determined with sufficient certainty for all practical purposes. It was probably within a comparatively short distance of where the little-used track from Kokla to Thebes crosses the river, probably between that track and the point where A1 enters the Asopus. It must be remembered that the modern village of Kokla, which is close to the site of Platæa (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles southwest of it, higher up the slope of Kithæron), is a small, poor place of fifty or sixty houses, and its communication with the outside world is chiefly carried on through Kriekouki. The track which leads direct to Thebes is therefore but little used, except as a farm track to the plough lands in the plain, and consequently, unless you actually walk along it to the Asopus, its course is not easy to ascertain. Taking, then, Pausanias' measurements, the site of Scolus must be looked for on the Asopus River from 1 mile to $1\frac{1}{2}$ below, *i.e.*, east of the bridge by which the Thebes road crosses this stream. I could not find any traces of it; nor is this surprising when the marshy nature of the land near the Asopus is considered. The Persian camp, then, must have lain on both sides of the Asopus, and the road from Athens to Thebes must have passed right through it. How far south of the river it came, may, I think, be determined approximately from the words used by Herodotus later on.* He says that *after* the Greeks had moved to their second position, the Persians, when they had completed their mourning for Masistius, παρῆσαν, πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἑλληνας εἶναι ἐν Πλαταιῆστι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταῦτη βέοντα.

Now I think that the word *πυθόμενοι* implies that the new position of the Greeks, and probably too, their movement to this position was not in sight of the Persian camp. Without at present entering into discussion as to the exact locality of this position, it can at any rate be said that all authorities who have discussed the question are agreed as to its being somewhere in the neighbour-

* Herod. ix. 31.

hood of Platæa itself. The Persian camp did not then extend to the summit of the ridges to which I have (for purposes of distinction) given the names of the Plateau, and the Long Ridge, because if it had, the new position of the Greeks and their movement to it would have been in full view of the Persians, and the word *πυθόμενοι* would hardly have been used by Herodotus.

I think, then, that we must conclude that the Persian camp was confined to the lower grounds in the neighbourhood of the Asopus.

We now come to that part of Herodotus' narration which has to be treated with the greatest care. Herodotus describes the movement of the Greeks to the second position in the following words* : μετὰ δὲ ἔδοξέ σφι ἐπικαταβῆναι ἐς Πλαταιάς· ὁ γὰρ χῶρος ἐφαίνετο πολλῷ ἐών ἐπιτηδεότερός σφι ἐνστρατοπεδεύεσθαι ὁ Πλαταικὸς τοῦ Ἐρυθραίου τά τε ἀλλα καὶ εὐνόδρότερος. ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην τὴν ἐν τῷ χώρῳ τούτῳ ἐούσαν ἔδοξέ σφι χρεὸν εἶναι ἀπικέσθαι καὶ διαταχθέντας στρατοπεδεύεσθαι. ἀναλαβόντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα ἥμαν διὰ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος παρὰ Υσιὰς ἐς τὴν Πλαταιᾶδα γῆν, ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἐτάσσοντο κατὰ ἔνεα πλησίον τῆς τε κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης καὶ τοῦ τεμένεος τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτεος τοῦ ἥρως διὰ ὅχθων τε οὐκ ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀπέδουν χωρίου.

We see then that they passed along the ὑπωρέη, i.e., probably along the upper or south part of ridges 1, 2, 3, and 4, past Hysiae. Tradition gives the site of the modern Kriekouki as that of Hysiae. This would accord with the passage from Pausanias which says that the ruins of Hysiae and Erythræ lay a little to the right of the road from Eleutheræ to Platæa. I am inclined, however, to think that the site of Hysiae is to be sought for a little higher up than the site of Kriekouki, and that it lay at the mouth of the pass through which went the Athens Platæa Road (i.e., pass No. 2). This site I have marked in the map. There is a mound there with a more or less circular enclosure on the top, quite close to the great bend of the loop road above the village of Kriekouki (anyone visiting the place may identify it by certain trees, olives, if I remember rightly, on the west side of the enclosure). This enclosure may well mark the site of the foundations of an ancient φρούριον, which would command the alternative route from Athens to Thebes by way of this pass, but would lie east of the road (i.e., to the right, as Pausanias says), from Athens to Platæa, which issues from the pass at the other side of the valley.

In the walls of some of the houses in the large village of

* Herod. ix. 25.

The second position of the Greeks.

Kriekouki are stones which have the appearance of having been taken from some pre-existing building or buildings, probably standing in the near neighbourhood of the site of the present village; nor is it easy to believe that the large amount of stone used in the construction of the village was all quarried in the small excavations which are at present to be seen in and about the present site.

The Spring of
Gargaphia.

We now come to a point which is very difficult to determine at the present day, namely, the position of the Spring of Gargaphia.

There is a local tradition as to the position of the spring which points to the spring, or rather collection of springs, known as Apotripi (I give the phonetic spelling), which, so I am told, being interpreted, is Alopeki, or the Fox's spring, as the Spring which Herodotus speaks of. Now I did not accept this tradition unexamined. I went over the area within which the spring of Gargaphia could possibly be supposed to lie many times, twice with surveying instruments, and I found only one other spring existent which could possibly answer to the description of Herodotus. (For the benefit of those who may visit Plataea, I may say that the collection of springs I mention as the traditional

- > Gargaphia is on the track from Kriekouki to Pyrgos and Leuctra, about a quarter of a mile before it enters on the flat water-shed between the Oeroe and the Asopus basins.) The springs do not give a very copious supply of water. But there is another collection of springs lying some distance east of the last-mentioned collection, which, together with a well close by them, afford a considerable quantity of water, greater, I should fancy, than that afforded by the springs of Apotripi. These I believe to be the Gargaphia of which Herodotus speaks. I had not Colonel Leake's book with me at Kriekouki, but I have since seen that the spring or springs I mention are the same as those which he identifies with the Gargaphia. The position of this spring is 16 stades from Plataea, whereas the spring of Apotripi is about 12. It is easy to imagine that a mistake of 4 stades was made in a measurement of the distance by the eye alone; it is not so easy to suppose that the error amounted to 8 stades in a calculated distance of 20.

- > (a) Herodotus, in the long passage recently quoted at length, says that the position of the Greeks was διὰ ὅχθων τε οὐκ ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀπέδον χώρων. The description ὅχθοι οὐκ ὑψήλοι would be very applicable to the land near the spring, probably the foot of the Asopus Ridge. The ἀπέδον χώρων must, we know, refer to the land near the τέμενος of Androcrates, which lay in the plain.

(b) Herodotus says* : τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἣς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, συνετάραξαν καὶ συνέχωσαν. This shows that the amount of water given out by the spring must have been considerable.

Those who are acquainted with Herodotus' account of the battle, will easily believe that I examined the north side of the Asopus ridge carefully, with a view to seeing whether there was any spring there which would answer to the description of Herodotus. There are two springs on that side, just below the ridge at the head of the depressions or valleys which run down to the Asopus, but they, even in January, at a time of heavy rain, were much too small to make it possible to identify them with the spring mentioned by Herodotus. In September, the time at which the battle was fought, they would probably be much smaller.

(c) Herodotus says that the νῆσος† was 10 stades from the spring. The actual distance of that piece of land, which I venture to think is the νῆσος from the spring, is just about 10 stades.

(d) Herodotus further says‡ that the spring was 20 stades distant from the Ἡραῖον, which, he says, is πρὸ τῆς πόλιος τῆς Πλαταιέων.‡ The identity of the Heræum has not yet been fully established. Placing it on the near side of what was then probably the πόλις of Platæa, it would be about 16 stades distant from the spring. If on the far side about 18 or 19.

The spring of Apotripi is about 12 stades from Platæa. These then, are the facts which we have to go on. With respect to the volume of the spring which is meant by Herodotus, it may of course be urged that that has altered in the course of time. It may have so altered, but we are surely not justified in assuming that such has been the case.

We do know from Pausanias that the spring after being filled up by the Persians, was subsequently restored by the Platæans. Pausanias' words are § :—τὴν δὲ κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίαν Μαρδόνιος καὶ ἡ ἵππος συνέχεεν ἡ Περσῶν, ὅτι τὸ Ἑλλήνων στράτευμα τὸ ἀντικαθήμενό σφισιν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔπινεν· ὑστερον μέντοι τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεσώσαντο οἱ Πλαταιεῖς.

We have no means, so far as I know, of determining exactly the position of the τέμενος of the hero Androcrates, which Herodotus tells us was the other extremity of the line, i.e., on the left wing. Yet we have certain details given in Thucydides which enable us to determine its position approximately. He says that the two

* Herod. ix. 49.

† Ib. ix. 51.

‡ Ib. ix. 62.

§ Paus. ix. 4. 3.

hundred and twelve who escaped from Platæa during the siege ὅρμησαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρου οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἔχώρουν ἀθρόου τὴν ἐς Θήβας φέρουσαν ὅδον, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἥρων καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἔξ οὐ πάτε σταδίους οἱ Πλαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν Θηβῶν ἔχώρησαν, ἐπειδὴ ὑποστρέψαντες, γεσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅρος φερούσαν ὅδον ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ Υσιάς.

It is evident then that Thucydides understood the Ἡρων to be less than three-quarters of a mile from Platæa, though the dimensions he gives are quite approximate. Moreover, the Ἡρων lay on the right of the road from Platæa to Thebes. The road which the fugitives took after turning, would be almost certainly the track leading from Pyrgos and Leuctra towards Kriekouki by way of the fount of the Apotripi. This point I have already touched upon.

Now it is a curious fact that if the νῆσος lay where Vischer and Colonel Leake believe it to have been, the τέμενος of the hero Androcrates must have been either upon it, or quite close to it. When I say "quite close," I mean, even taking Thucydides' statement of distances, "6 or 7 stades," to be very roughly approximate, that it can only have been a few yards from this supposed νῆσος. Now I come to the question which is, I cannot but think, the real difficulty in Herodotus' account of the operations of the field. When Herodotus speaks of the Asopus River in connection with the second position of the Persian and the Greek force, what does he mean? I think the solution of this difficulty is that he includes under this name (probably, from what seems to me after seeing the ground, owing to a very natural error either in his information, or even in his own observation), not only the main stream of the Asopus, called by Colonel Leake the Thespian Asopus, but also the stream marked in my map as A1.

The Asopus
River.

The references made to the Asopus in relation to the second position of the Greeks and Persians are as follows:—

(a) At the end of chapter 25, Herodotus describes, without mentioning the Asopus, the second position of the Greeks, as being near the Spring of Gargaphia and the τέμενος of the hero Androcrates, etc.*

This passage I have already quoted. He then describes at length this dispute for the position on the left between the Athenians and Tegeans, and so forth. But at the end of chapter 30, he says, after describing in detail the Greek array, σὺντοι μέν νυν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο.†

* Herod. ix. 25.

† Ib. ix. 30.

I venture to think that the Asopus here mentioned is probably A1, and not the Thespian Asopus at all.

(b) At the beginning of the next chapter, in fact in the very next sentence to the words which I have just quoted, Herodotus says that the Persians, after completing the mourning for Masistius, παρῆσαν, πυθόμενοι τὸν Ἑλλῆνας εἶναι ἐν Πλαταιῆσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτην βέοντα.

It is surely worthy of remark that Herodotus after having mentioned the Asopus without any qualification, in the last sentence of the last chapter, now adds to the name of the Asopus in chapter 31 the words τὸν ταύτην βέοντα, not evidently referring directly to the Asopus at the end of chapter 30, but to the words ἐν Πλαταιῆσι, I do not think that there can be any reasonable doubt that the stream here mentioned is the main Asopus, the Thespian Asopus of Leake, and that the Persian position was on the north, or Theban side of that stream. May not the words τὸν ταύτην βέοντα possibly indicate that Herodotus had some sort of consciousness that what he called the Asopus was really a main stream in one case, and an otherwise nameless tributary in the other?

(c) In chapter 40 come the words: * μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον (viz., the capture of the Greek provision train) ἐτέρας δύο ἡμέρας διέτριψαν, οὐδέτεροι βουλόμενοι μάχης ἀρξαντείρων μέχρι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ ἐπήισαν οἱ βάρβαροι πειρώμενοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, διέβαινον δὲ οὐδέτεροι. ή μέντοι ἵππος ή Μαρδονίου αἰεὶ προσέκειτο τε καὶ ἐλύπτες τὸν Ἑλλῆνας.

Certainly, here the Asopus is the main, or Thespian Asopus. The second position of the Greeks had three developments.

There is evidently a gap in Herodotus' narrative. It is impossible to bring the τέμενος of Androcrates even near to the main Asopus without flying in the face of the only historical evidence as to its position to which we can have recourse. The left wing of the Greeks must, then, have swung round, or advanced from the τέμενος, which cannot have been less than 1½ miles from the river, towards the main Asopus, probably emboldened by the fact that the main body of the Persians did not venture to cross the stream.

The right wing also seems to have moved to the top of the Asopus ridge, since Herodotus' words, already quoted, seem to imply that they were not in sight of the Persian camp when they first took up the second position near the Gargaphia, whereas his words in describing their withdrawal from this second position show that their position must have been within sight of Mardonius, when on the far side of the Asopus.

Herodotus then relates that Mardonius became impatient at the

* Herod. ix. 40.

delay, especially in view of the fact that the Greek army was continually increasing. The Greek reinforcements would probably come over the pass No. 3, *i.e.*, along the road from Megara to Platæa, since the mouths of the other two passes were probably occupied by the Persian cavalry. We have, then, an account of the consultation between Mardonius and Artabazus, and of Mardonius' decision to attack the Greeks; of Mardonius' enquiry concerning the existing oracles; of Alexander of Macedon's visit to the Greek outposts, and his information respecting the attack; of Pausanias' proposal to the Athenians to exchange positions with the Spartans, and of the double change, together with the message sent by Mardonius to the Spartans.

Then in chapter 49 we get a further mention of the Asopus. Herodotus says that Mardonius, on receiving no answer to the message which he had sent to the Greeks,* περιχαρής γενόμενος καὶ ἐπαερθεὶς ψυχρῇ νίκῃ ἐπῆκε τὴν ὑπὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνα. ὡς δὲ ἐπῆλασαν οἱ ἵπποι, ἐσίνοντο πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἐσακοντίζοντες τε καὶ ἐστοξεύοντες ὥστε ἵπποιξόται τε ἔοντες καὶ προσφέρεσθαι ἀποροι· τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἣς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικον, συνετάραξαν καὶ συνέχωσαν. ἡσαν μὲν ὅν κατὰ τὴν κρήνην Λακεδαιμόνιοι τεταγμένοι μοῦνοι, τῶισι δὲ ἀλλοισι Ἑλλησι ἡ μὲν κρήνη πρόσω ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἔκαστοι ἔτυχον τεταγμένοι, ὃ δὲ Ἀσωπὸς ἀγχοῦ· ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτων· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γάρ σφι οὐκ ἔχην ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἵππεών καὶ τοξεύμάτων.

Here I wish, with diffidence, it is true, to insert a conjecture. I insert it with diffidence because the evidence in favour of it is perhaps slight, though the conjecture itself is probable enough. I am disposed to think that there was a third development, if I may so call it, of the second position of the Greeks. What I mean is this, that under pressure of the cavalry attack the Greek left and centre retired from the flat ground, and took refuge on the north extension of the Asopus ridge, to the east of stream A1. The facts in Herodotus which seem to point to this are:—

1. His remark that the whole of the Greek army when cut off from the Asopus, got their water-supply from Gargaphia. If their left had remained in the plain it is difficult to understand how this could have been done effectively—also why should they not have recourse to A1, which must be supplied with water along a great part of its course during even the dry months of the year, since its water-supply is chiefly derived from Apotripi? If the

Second position,
third development.

* Herod. ix. 49.

army was on the ridge and the whole plain was, as was probably the case, overrun by Persian cavalry, the Spring of Gargaphia would be the natural and only place from which water could be obtained, since the Apotripi is in *ἰππάσιμος χῶρος* [as is, indeed, the spring I identify as Gargaphia], but the Apotripi had no guard set by it, as the Gargaphia had.

2. Herodotus, in describing the start of the Athenians for the *νῆσος*, speaks of them as *τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδίον*. I do not wish to force the words, but they do seem the sort of words which would be used of movement from higher to lower ground.

3. Herodotus, ix. 56, speaks of the Athenians as, in the movement, *κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον*. If this means anything it means they went down hill to the plain, *not* along the flat, as they would have done had they remained in the second development of position 2.

Whether this conjecture be accepted or rejected, it does not, I wish to remark, affect in any important degree the identification of the localities in which the subsequent incidents of the fight took place.

The words quoted from chapter 49 indicate that the position of the Greek army was most critical. Their whole front was attacked. The left wing was driven back, though apparently not far from the Asopus, [here again probably, though not, I think, certainly, the Thespian Asopus,] since the whole of the course of A1, save the head of it at Apotripi, is in the plain. The Lacedæmonians even, who were probably on Asopus ridge, were attacked, and, apparently, while they were thus occupied, the Persian cavalry made its way round their right flank to the Gargaphia Spring which they filled in and rendered useless.

Having now given my reasons for so thinking, I may briefly state, what will already be seen by one who follows the argument, to be my opinion, that the second position of the Greeks was at first apparently below, or south of the Asopus ridge, down the slope to the stream A1, and from there to a point on the Thebes road $\frac{2}{3}$ to 1 mile from Platsea, in fact their left would be somewhere near the east extremity of the *νῆσος* as determined by Leake and Vischer. I believe that subsequently the Greek left advanced, and that it rested later on the Thespian Asopus, from which it was subsequently driven back by the Persian cavalry, and that the Spartans on the right moved up the slope to the top of the Asopus ridge.

I have also suggested that there was a third development of the

position in which the Greek left and centre found themselves on the north extension of the Asopus ridge. In the first phase of their second position the Platæa-Thebes road would pass with a somewhat diagonal direction across their front, in the second it would pass through the left wing, and between the left and centre.

The strategy of the Greek generals. I am disposed to believe that there is a special strategical significance in the two positions of the Greek army which is not alluded to in the account of Herodotus. The first position would seem to have been *à cheval* across the road from Athens to Thebes, and the second on the road from Platæa to Thebes. These are the two great roads to Thebes which cross the field. May it not have been the intention of Pausanias to strike a blow at Thebes itself, the base of the Persian operations? Surely the Greeks were on the offensive, as is proved by the very fact of their moving into Bœotia after Mardonius' retirement from Attica. How is it then possible for Herodotus to have missed this point?

Sources of Herodotus' information. I think the explanation may be easily found. The account of Herodotus as to facts seems to be a good one, and as I have said before is reasonably consistent with the ground at the present time. But notice the reasons he gives for facts. They are just the reasons which would be given by some one who was present at the battle, but who was not in a position to be acquainted with the designs and intentions of those in supreme control of the army. The want of water: the annoyance caused by the Persian cavalry, such are the reasons given for movements. They are very good practical reasons, and the facts as related support them, but can we suppose that they were the only reasons which influenced Pausanias and the other commanders? I cannot think so. What seems to me to have been the probable case is this; that Herodotus, writing half a century after the battle, got his information from capable observers who had been present there, but who served in a more or less inferior capacity.

The movement to the island. We now have to deal with the movement to the island, which was ordered, but never completed. Let us take Herodotus' account of what happened, and his description of the ground.* He says, on this taking place, the generals of the Greeks, inasmuch as the army was deprived of water, and thrown into confusion by the cavalry, *συνελέχθησαν περὶ αὐτῶν τε τούτων καὶ ἄλλων, ἐλθόντες παρὰ Πανοραίην ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας.* ἄλλα γὰρ τούτων τοιούτων ἐόντων μᾶλλον σφεας ἐλύπεε· οὔτε γὰρ σιγία εἶχον ἔτι, οἱ τέ σφεων ὀπέωντες ἀποπεμφθέντες ἐς Πελοπόννησον ὡς ἐπισιτιεύμενοι ἀπο-

* Herod. ix. 50.

κεκληγάτο ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀπικέσθαι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον. βουλευομένοισι δὲ τοῦτι στρατηγοῦσι ἔδοξε, ἣν ὑπερβάλωνται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέρην οἱ Πέρσαι συμβολὴν μὴ ποιεύμενοι, ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἴέναι. ἡ δέ ἐστι ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ καὶ τῆς κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης, ἐπ' ἥ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο τότε, δέκα σταδίους ἀπέχουσα, πρὸ τῆς Πλαταιέων πόλιος. νῆσος δὲ οὗτος ἀντὶ εἴη ἐν ἡπείρῳ σχιζόμενος ὁ ποταμὸς ἀνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος ῥέει κάτω ἐς τὸ πεδίον, διέχων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ῥέεθρα ὅσον περ τρία στάδια, καὶ ἐπειτα συμμισγει ἐς τῶντό· οὔνομα δέ οἱ Ὀερόη. θυγατέρα δὲ ταύτην λέγοντι εἶναι Ἀσωποῦ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι. ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον ἐβουλεύσαντο μεταναστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὥδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ καὶ οἱ ἵππεες σφέας μὴ σινούσι τὸ πεδίον κατιθὲν ἔοντων μετακινέσθαι τε ἔδόκεε τότε ἐπεὰν τῆς νυκτὸς ἥ δευτέρη φυλακή, ὡς ἀν μὴ ἰδούσιοι οἱ Πέρσαι ἔξορμωμένους καὶ σφέας ἐπόμενοι ταράσσοιεν οἱ ἵπποται. ἀπικομένων δὲ ἐς τὸν χῶρον τοῦτον, τὸν δὴ ἥ Ἀσωπίς Ὀερόη περισχίζεται ῥέουσα ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, ὑπὸ την νύκτα ταύτην ἔδόκεε τοὺς ἡμίσεας ἀποστέλλειν τοῦ στρατοπέδου πρὸς τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα, ὡς ἀναλάβοιεν τοὺς ὀπέωνας τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ σιτία οἰχομένους· ἡσαν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Κιθαιρῶνι ἀπολελαμμένοι.

Now, in respect to this part of the narrative, we have evidently Position of the first to try and determine upon the position of the νῆσος. It will island. be well to tabulate the facts which Herodotus mentions with regard to it.

1. It is 10 stades from the Asopus.
2. It is 10 stades from the Spring of Gargaphia.
3. It is πρὸ τῆς τῶν Πλαταιέων πόλιος.
4. The river divides ἀνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, and flows down into the plain.
5. The streams are ὅσον περ τρία στάδια distant from one another.
6. The streams afterwards join one another.
7. The name of the river is Oerœ.
8. There was a plentiful water-supply at the νῆσος.
9. The cavalry could not annoy them there, ὥστερ κατιθὲν ἔοντων.

Now, then, let us see how far the νῆσος indicated by Vischer and Leake agrees with these nine conditions. Position as determined by Vischer and Leake.

1. It is not 10 stades, but 13 or 14 stades from the Thespian Asopus, but it is 10 stades from stream A1.
2. It is considerably over 10 stades, viz., 15 or 16 stades from the spring Leake identifies, I think rightly, with the Gargaphia.
3. It is before, or in full view of the city of Platæa.
4. The words used by Herodotus do not seem to be exactly those he might have been expected to use in describing this piece of land. The streams divide at a point more than 2 miles above this νῆσος. 5, 6, 7 are adequately fulfilled by it.

It is when we come to 8 and 9, which are the very reasons stated by Herodotus for the movement to the island, that this position indicated absolutely fails to accord with the conditions.

Respecting the water-supply; it is conspicuously deficient, and of the three streams which cross the plain at this point, one was absolutely dry at the time of my visit, and this one was that which would have formed the point of the island toward the Persian army, viz. O1. The second contained water, but in a much less quantity than before it entered the plain. The third contained water, but not in any quantity. Now, this was at a period of peculiarly heavy rains. In September, all of them would almost certainly be dry by the time they reached this part of the plain. O1, being almost a pure drainage stream, would be probably dry almost along its whole course. There would under no circumstances have been water enough in this conjectured *vŷros*, at that time of the year, to supply an army of one-tenth the number of the Greek force. We cannot even assume exceptionally heavy rain (which would be a very extraordinary circumstance, I understand, in the month of September), for in that case, the lands by the Asopus would have been impassable for cavalry, and even infantry would have been unable to cross them. I speak from personal experience. I wanted to get down to the river, in order to get points of survey on it, since its course is not distinguishable with certainty, even from a furlong off, but after getting into plough, into which I sank above my knees, and after my Albanian servant had come down and nearly disappeared with my plan-table, I gave it up. I could not reach it at that point, and that part of the Asopus had to remain marked in my map by a dotted line, which although it gives the course very nearly, does not pretend to the same accuracy as the rest of the map.

To return to the supposed *vŷros*, let us take condition 9. There are really two conditions in it. (a) The Persian cavalry could not damage them so much as in the former position.

(b) Because they would not attack them on the front.

Respecting (a), what is the character of these stream beds? I have no hesitation in saying that they afford no serious obstacles to cavalry, for at least 90 out of every 100 yards of their course. A horse could cross them in most places without even easing from its gallop. Even if this last fact be doubted, it must be remembered that the Persian cavalry fought *eminus*, not *cominus*, as Herodotus expressly says, and the Greeks could not have faced them across a watercourse, a yard or two broad, so as to be able to

prevent their crossing, even had the crossing been a work of some difficulty to a mounted man. And if further argument on this point be wanted, I can only say that it is impossible to conceive how the generals of the Greeks, having found the main Asopus an utterly insufficient protection, could have supposed that the army would be in safety behind these much slighter watercourses.

Have the stream beds altered in character?

I do not believe they have. Let us suppose, however, that some alteration in character has taken place. What form must it have taken? Only this, that the plain has been raised by earth brought down from the uplands. With what result? That the channels would be deeper now than at the time of the battle, which is all in favour of what I have said.

(b) Had the Greek position been on this ground, the attack could *only* have been on the front. Look at the accompanying map, nay, look at Colonel Leake's own map, which though incorrect in detail, as might have been expected from a more or less hurried survey of a large tract of country, does also represent this part of the ground with fair accuracy. It could *not* have been from any other side.

There is another point mentioned by Herodotus, which is very difficult to reconcile with the location of the *vŷros*, in the position which Leake and Vischer place it. Herodotus says,* that when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians did actually begin their movement to the *vŷros*, *oi μὲν* (the Lacedæmonians) *τῶν τε ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, φοβεόμενοι τὴν ἵππον Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.*

Probably at the time, ridges 3 and 4 (*v. map*) formed part of the *ὑπωρέη*. They have scattered upon them heaps of large stones, which show the cultivation of them to be comparatively of recent date, heaps of stones which are not found in any other part of the field. Though it does not bear upon the point I now propose to make, I may mention in this connection, that the discovery of an ancient boundary stone on ridge 2, which I did not see, for it was covered up by the soil, and by a crop thereon, but of which Dr. Merethides told me, seems to point to the fact, which the contours also render probable, of the cultivation at that part of the field being of ancient date.

Possibly, then, it was ridge 3 to which the Lacedæmonians turned, but, if the island was where the authorities mentioned place it, the reason for the movement is hard to understand, since

* Herod. ix. 56.

to reach the supposed *vŷros*, they would still have had to cross the dangerous ground, at the lower part of the low ridge 5. In fact, they might just as well have taken a direct course, for all the good it would be to them. I do not, however, wish to lay too much stress on this argument, as I believe the real object of the course taken by the Spartans to have been the relief of those blocked up in the pass, probably No. 2, a reason which we may well deduce from Herodotus' own words in describing the decision to move to the island.* They determined, on arriving at this place (*vŷros*), to send off the half of the army towards Kithæron in the course of this night to recover the attendants who had gone after the provisions, they being blocked in Kithæron.

It seems also hardly likely after the damage they had suffered in position 2 that they could ever have come to the decision to send off from the *vŷros* of Leake and Vischer one-half of the army to the pass. It would be obliged to march across a mile of *πτάσιμος χῶρος*, between Platæa and ridge 4, and to venture itself at a distance of 2½ to 3 miles from the remainder of the army.

One is then reluctantly forced to the conclusion, that either Herodotus is wrong, or the location of the *vŷros* in this position is wrong.

Forgive the assuredness with which I now speak. I do not believe that Herodotus is wrong at all. The confusion has been caused here, as elsewhere in his narrative, by what I believe to be his application of the name Asopus to the river itself, and its tributary A1. It is a very natural mistake. Go and stand on the site of the city of Platæa, and you will soon see how the confusion might easily arise. The Asopus ridge will be in full view, and you will know that the Asopus passes behind it from where you are standing. You will see the course of A1, indistinctly, it is true, but traceably, all along the foot of the west slope of the ridge. But what of Leake's Thespian Asopus, the real upper course of the river? You will not be able to trace its course, unless it be in flood, and you might be well led to suppose that stream A1 is the upper main stream of the river.

(At the end of the paper will be found a note on the names applied to the river, (1) in the Austrian map, (2) in Colonel Leake's account.)

Now I think, as I have already indicated, that Colonel Leake and Vischer have not sought for the island in the right place. There is one fact quite evident in Herodotus' account: The

* Herod. ix. 51.

νῆσος must have lain between the branches of the Oeroe. I think it is to be found higher up the interval between the two rivers, at the point I have indicated in my map, and that it consisted of ridge 4, and possibly of ridge 3 also. Anyone who takes the higher road from Kriekouki to Kokla cannot fail to be struck by the peculiarity of the ground, should he happen to look down towards the plain at the point where the road passes close to the narrow strip of ground which separates the sources of the streams O1, and the east branch of O3.

These sources, as will be seen by the map, are close together, and the ridge which separates them is quite low at the narrowest part. The stream O3 (east branch) flows down towards the plain at first in a deep valley with a very steep slope towards the *νῆσος*, which valley it leaves at the point where the streams unite, which form O3. From this point it flows beneath the *νῆσος*, which rises steeply above it, whereas on the other side of it, i.e., on the west side, the ground slopes quite gradually up to the rounded back of the low-lying ridge 5. The stream O1 flows down to the plain in a deep depression. Now it is true that at the present day these streams do not join immediately on reaching the plain; but to show how possible it is that their courses in the flat alluvial ground may have altered again and again within certain limits, in the course of time, I may mention that when Colonel Leake visited this ground the stream O2 did not join O3 at the point where it now joins it, but was a separate stream from it, at the point where the Kokla Thebes road passes the branches of the Oeroe, i.e., more than a mile below the present junction. There is another very striking point about this piece of land, which is noticeable in the contouring of it in the map. Its insular character is, if I may so speak, emphasised by a large hillock which rises on it close by O3, and which is a most prominent object, especially when viewed from Platea itself. This hillock may be identified by any one visiting the ground, owing to its having on the south slope of it a white cottage, the only building existent between Kriekouki and Kokla, and by a tall pine-tree on the slope of it towards Platea, i.e. the west side.

Now it will, I think, be found on examination of the evidence that this locality corresponds most closely with the description of the *νῆσος* given by Herodotus, and that furthermore, the incidents of the battle, as related by Herodotus, support in a remarkable degree the hypothesis that this is the *νῆσος* he describes. Let us recur to the nine conditions to be fulfilled.

Condition 1.—It is, like Vischer and Leake's *νῆσος*, 10 stades from stream A1.

Condition 2.—It is, unlike their *νῆσος*, 10 stades from the Gargaphia Spring which Leake identifies.

Condition 3.—It may be peculiarly well described as *πρὸ τῆς τῶν Πλαταιῶν πόλιος*.

(a) Because the ground of Platæa city has a strong slope this way, *vide* contour on the map, in fact "verges" towards the east, as well as towards the north.

(b) Because looking at it from the site of Platæa, across the low ridge 5, it, especially the hillock, stands out in a remarkable way.

Condition 4.—The river division *ἄνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος* whether it be taken as the division between O1 and O3, or O2 is peculiarly striking in either case, the head-waters of the streams nearly touching.

Condition 5.—O3 and O2 are 3 stadia from one another. O3 and O1 are nearly 4 stadia.

(N.B. The distance in Herodotus' account must have been judged by the eye.)

Condition 6.—The streams *do* join now, but may well have joined one another at a point higher up their course, at the time the battle was fought. *Vide* evidence given on this point.

Condition 7.—The streams are the head-waters of the Oeroe.

Condition 8.—The water-supply of O3 is derived, as will be seen, from seven streams. On these streams are two large springs, one of which is called by Leake the Spring of Vergutiani, and is, apparently, identical with what I believe to be the *πήγη* of Pausanias. Besides these two springs there are numerous smaller ones, and O3, as it passes beneath the hillock on the *νῆσος*, is quite a large stream, but like the other streams which flow to the plain its volume goes on decreasing the further it gets into the flat country. The fact of its water being derived almost entirely from springs is a good guarantee of it being peculiarly noticeable in respect of water-supply in the dry months, and of its justifying Herodotus' remark that the army would be able, on the *νῆσος*, *ὑδατι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ*.* It must be remembered, too, that the position of the Greeks, on this ground I indicate, would allow the army safe access to all the springs on the neighbouring rocky slope of Kithæron.

Condition 9, Part a.—Reference to the map will show how well this condition is fulfilled by the ground. The position would be

* Herod. ix. 51.

unassailable by cavalry on the north and west. On the west the slope of the *vŷros* is very steep indeed, on the east the valley of O1 is deep, and besides the *vŷros* side of it was evidently at that time stony ground, and similar to the Kithæron slope, on which cavalry could not act.

If we take O2 as the boundary of the island, then we should have on the far side of it the then rocky ridge 3, although the valley of O2 is not so deep as that of O1. The only point, then, at which this ground would be assailable, would be at the north end, or bottom of the slope. This brings me to the second part of Condition 9.

Condition 9, Part b.—The last fact mentioned explains Herodotus' words, *ως κατίθυ ἐόντων*. Any force on this ground would, from the shape of the ground itself, have its flank at the side, on which alone the ground was assailable.

Such then are the reasons, taken from Herodotus, which induce me to take what may appear to be, and is, I confess, a very decided view as to the position of the ground called the island. But I think there are other considerations of a strategic character which support this view. I think that a brief examination of the map, whether of the map I have made, or of the one which is to be found in Leake's 'Northern Greece,' will show that it would have been difficult for the Greek generals to choose a spot in the whole neighbourhood of Platæa which would have rendered their position in case of disaster a more hopeless one than that island of Vischer and Leake. Now the possibility of disaster must have been very present to their minds at the time that the determination to move to the island was made.

Herodotus' description of the state of the army under the continued attacks of the Persian cavalry is brief, but graphic, and the panic-like flight of the whole centre to Platæa emphasizes what he says. Now consider the position of the Greek force had disaster overtaken them on that tongue of land. In the first place they would have been surrounded by the Persian cavalry, since the ground between it and Platæa, a considerable stretch of land, is all *ιππάσημος χῶρος*, and to all intents and purposes absolutely flat. Supposing, even, that they did try to cut their way out, they would have been obliged either to take the west direction towards the Corinthian Gulf, or to make their way to one of the passes. In either case the result must have been the practical, if not the actual ruin of the Greek army. The way to the Corinthian Gulf, however, would be outside all calculation, since —

(1) There was so far as we know no fleet in the Gulf which could have possibly transported even a small fraction of the force across it.

(2) The only path across Kithæron west of Platea from Xenophon's description must be an exceedingly difficult one, and is besides some 9 or 10 miles distant from Platea; in fact, it can never have entered into the calculations of the Greek generals.

Now as to the three passes which lead on to the ground, if we bear in mind the condition of the Greek army at the time of the movement, can we suppose for one moment that the Greek generals would move to a position further away from the passes than they were before the movement? Surely their natural course would be to retire to the higher ground where they would be in comparative safety from the Persian cavalry, and where, in the position I have indicated, they would be exactly between the passes 2 and 3, *i.e.*, the passes which, as I have mentioned, are on the roads from Platea to Athens and to Megara respectively, and where too they would be in easy communication with both by way of the rocky portion of the *ηπωρέν*.

I may say here once and for all that a study of the modern authorities, who have written on the subject of the battle, has given me the impression that they do not credit the Greek generals with the slightest military capacity of the most elementary kind. I cannot share their view. My own belief is that there was a plan in the Greek operations at Platea, and I have tried to indicate what I believe to be the portions of that plan which we are justified, as I think, in conjecturing with a considerable amount of probability at the present time.

This argument is, I am afraid, long, but it is, I think, important not to miss any point in the narrative of events which can possibly throw light on the question. The last point I wish to bring forward is this. We have in Herodotus the remarkable tale of the refusal of Amompharetus the Spartan officer to move towards the island with the rest of the Spartan force. Now the words to be noted, I think, in the account of this incident are the following :* *ἐνθαῦτα* (on the order to move being given to the Spartan division) *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄρτιοι ἦσαν τῶν ταξιάρχων πείθεσθαι Πανσανίην*. 'Αμομφάρετος δὲ ὁ Πολιάδεω λοχηγέων τοῦ Σιτανήτεω λόχου οὐκ ἐφη τοὺς ξείνους φεύξεσθαι αὐδὲ ἐκὼν εἶναι αἰσχυνέειν τὴν Σπάρτην, ἐθώμαζέ τε ὁρέων τὸ ποιεύμενον ἄτε οὐ παραγενόμενος τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ. ὁ δὲ Πανσανίης τε καὶ ὁ Εύρυνάξ δεινὸν μὲν ἐποιεῦντο τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι ἐκείνον σφίσι, δεινό-

* Herod. ix. 53.

τερον δὲ ἔτι κείου ταῦτ' ἀναινομένου ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν λόχον τὸν Πιτανήτην, μὴ ἦν ἀπολίτωσι ποιεῦντες τὰ συνεθήκαντο τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἑλλησι, ἀπόληται ὑπολειφθεὶς αὐτὸς τε Ἀμορφάρετος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ. ταῦτα λογιζόμενοι ἀτρέμας εἶχον τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Λακωνικὸν καὶ ἐπειρώντο πειθούτες μιν ὡς οὐ χρέον εἴη ταῦτα ποιέειν.

Later in presence of the Athenian messenger, Amompharetus, says Herodotus, took up a stone with both his hands and placing it before the feet of Pausanias said that ταύτη τῇ ψήφῳ ψηφίζεσθαι ἔφη μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς ἔσινος, λέγων τοὺς βαρβάρους. *

That a Spartan was quite capable of displaying irrational obstinacy, is, I take it, indisputable. Still Herodotus' words as to the attitude of Pausanias and Euryanax on receiving the refusal would seem to show that such action as that of Amompharetus was very extraordinary, or even unprecedented in a Spartan officer on active service in face of the enemy. There must have been some strong feeling in Amompharetus' mind to urge him to adopt such an attitude. The feeling is described by Herodotus as the disgrace of retreating before the enemy.

The feeling is hardly comprehensible if the movement was to be to the island in the plain: it is comprehensible if the movement was to be towards Kithæron, as would be the case under my hypothesis, since he might very well suspect that the real design of Pausanias was to retreat over Kithæron into Attica.

Before quitting the question of the island I must add one word. I should not have ventured to contest the views of such men as Vischer and Leake on this subject were not my own views on the matter very strong, and did I not know the field of Platæa better than any similar area of country either in my own land or outside it.

It now remains to deal with the last great scene in this strange ^{The great} battle, the final catastrophe in which the Greeks turned what fight promised to be and looked like a serious defeat into a great and crushing victory.

Herodotus tells us that Amompharetus never supposed at first Spartans and that Pausanias would venture to leave him, and remained where Persians. he was. Pausanias, however, marched forward with the rest of the Spartan force, and Amompharetus, seeing that the main body was leaving him in good earnest, proceeded to follow it slowly. τὸ δὲ (the main force) ἀπελθὸν ὅσον τε δέκα στάδια ἀνέμενε τὸν Ἀμορφάρετον λόχον, περὶ ποταμὸν Μολόεντα Ιδρυμένον Ἀργυόπιον τε χῶρον καλεόμενον, τῇ καὶ Δήμητρος Ἐλευσινής ἱὸν ἤσται.†

* Herod. ix. 55.

† Ib. ix. 57.

The question which has now to be dealt with is the position of this temple of Eleusinian Demeter. It is, I need hardly say, a much more difficult question, in one respect, than that of the *νῆσος*. We are not now dealing with a piece of ground, whose general characteristics at the present day are recognisable, but with a building which has long vanished, and whose traces are hard, if not impossible to find. Before I produce the evidence which, I think, is in favour of the position in which I am disposed to place the building and *τέμενος*, I wish to say one word as to the movement of the Spartans. Herodotus, in words which I have already quoted, tells us that it was the intention of the Greeks, on moving to the island, to detach a part of the army to relieve the attendants who were blocked up in the pass. This is certainly pass 1 or pass 2, most likely pass 2, which they were probably attempting to use as an alternative way, after the fearful disaster had befallen the former provision train in the exit of the *Δρυὸς κεφαλαὶ* pass. Herodotus shows, too, that this relief was urgently required, since the Greek army was running short of provisions, for though pass 3 must have been open, yet it is, I understand, of such a character as to render it impossible that the commissariat for a force of one hundred thousand men could be adequately maintained through its channel. It is therefore in the very highest degree probable that an attempt, at any rate, was made to carry out this part of the arrangement between the generals. Now the Spartan force on the right of the Greek line would be, as far as position was concerned, that portion of the Greek army on which this duty would naturally devolve. Furthermore, though I think the respective positions of the members of the Greek force in the second position is almost conclusive of this point, I may bring forward another strong consideration, which seems to me to support the view I venture to take. The mission of this force to be detached for the relief of the pass was, and must have been recognised as, under the circumstances, one of extreme danger and difficulty, and it would be natural that the service should devolve on that part of the army which enjoyed the highest military reputation. Now it was, I believe, while carrying out this movement that the Spartans were involved in that series of events which led to the last catastrophe in the great tragedy. Herodotus, in the words recently quoted, gives the following facts:

(1) That Pausanias with the main body of the Spartans advanced 10 stadia, and then waited for Amompharetus and his *λοχός*.

(2) That he waited at the River Moloeis in what is called the Argiopian country.

(3) That there is a temple of Eleusinian Demeter in that part. To which I may add from an earlier chapter:

(4) Pausanias, after failing to persuade Amompharetus, starts at dawn: his movement Herodotus describes as follows:—"He (Pausanias) σημίνας ἀπῆρε διὰ τῶν κολονῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς πάτρας· εἴποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται . . . οἱ μὲν γάρ (i.e., the Lacedæmonians) τῶν τε ὅχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπαρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, φοβεόμενοι τὴν ἵππον.

Circumstances 1 and 2 I will take together. Notice that this is the first mention of the River Moloeis. We may therefore conclude that it is not any stream which has been previously referred to in the account of the battle. This brook is 10 stades from the Spartan position near Gargaphia.

Though we know nothing of the exact position of the Argiopian country, may we not conjecture that it had some more or less striking characteristic which caused it to be called by a special name?

Now I venture to think that the brook A5 is probably the River Moloeis. It will be seen on the map that the distance from the position of the Spartans near that spring which Leake (rightly, I think, as I have previously said) identifies with Gargaphia, accords closely with the distance given by Herodotus.

With a less degree of probability I venture to think that the Plateau, or possibly the Long Ridge, may be the Argiopian country. Both, as the contours will show, have noticeable peculiarities which mark them off from their surroundings.

(5) Now for the question of the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. I venture to think that the ruins of the church of St. Demetrius or Demetrian (I am not sure which name is correct) are very probably on or near the site of that temple, and that the *témenos* of the temple was on the flat top of that mound of the Long Ridge. The reasons which I bring forward for this view are as follows:—

(a) It will be, I think, admitted that the Christians in cases where they adopted an ancient temple, or the site of an ancient temple, as a Christian Church, were frequently apt, in dedicating the new church, to make a sort of pious pun on the dedication of pagan shrines. I have, at any rate, the very best authority for stating that this kind of nomenclature has been peculiarly common in Greece.

(b) Secondly, it is a fact that the discovery by Dr. Merethides

* Herod. ix. 56.

of the inscribed stones near the ancient wall, on the traditional site of Erythræ, shows that there was a temple of Eleusinian Demeter on that site; but that temples of Eleusinian Demeter were common in this region the account of Pausanias shows very clearly, e.g.,

Platæa: *Ἐστι δὲ καὶ Δήμητρος ἐπίκλησιν Ἐλευσινίας ἱερὸν ἐν Πλαταιᾶς.**

Scolus: *Δήμητρος δὲ καὶ Κόρης ἐν τοῖς ἐρειπίοις οὐκ ἔξειργασμένος δ ναός.*†

Potniæ,‡ on the road from Thebes to Platæa, 10 stades from Thebes, i.e., about 60 stades from Platæa: *Ποτνιῶν ἐστὶν ἐρείπια καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλλος Δήμητρος.*

We see then that we have evidence of the existence of four temples of Eleusinian Demeter in this neighbourhood, viz., the three of Pausanias and the one discovered by Dr. Merethides, of which three were actually within the field of Platæa.

Now it is plain, from the account of Herodotus, that the temple of Eleusinian Demeter to which he refers, was either in or close to the Argiopian country, *not* in Erythræ, *not* in Platæa, *not* in Scolus. There was then on the field of Platæa a temple of Demeter which Pausanius does not mention, in fact, *two*, reckoning the one at the traditional Erythræ. His omission to mention the one I refer to especially may possibly be accounted for by the fact that it lay, if I am right, *not* near the great road from Athens to Thebes *via* Δρὺς κεφαλαί, but near the alternative, and probably very much less frequented route between the two towns *via* pass No. 2 (v. map).

(c) Pausanias says: § *τρόπαιον δὲ ὁ τῆς μάχης τῆς Πλαταιῶν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἑλλῆνες, πεντεκαΐδεκα σταδίους μάλιστα ἐστηκεν ἀπωτέρω τῆς πόλεως, i.e., 15 stades further from the city than the altar of Zeus Eleutherios which, as Pausanias' context shows, lay between the town and the graves of those who fell in the battle. The site of those graves has probably been determined; it must have been, at any rate from what Pausanias says, quite close to the spot indicated in my map. Now the site of the church of St. Demetrius which, I venture to think, stands on the *τέμενος* of Eleusinian Demeter is about 3600 yards, or 18 stades, from these graves, and the mound on which I conjecture the trophy to have stood lies close to the Demetrian, almost due south of it, and about 16½ stades from the graves. It was, apparently, from Herodotus' account, on this*

* Paus. ix. 4. 2.

† Ib. ix. 4. 3.

‡ Ib. ix. 9. 1.

§ Ib. ix. 2. 6.

> mounded ridge and on either side of it that the Persians made their last stand.

(d) My hypothesis receives peculiar confirmation, as I shall show, from the account given by Herodotus of the subsequent incidents of the battle, but it will, I think, be best to take the incidents in the order given by Herodotus.

Following this plan, I shall now be able to deal in due course with circumstance 4. Let it be remembered that, taking into consideration *all* that Herodotus tells us, and not part of it, I am disposed to maintain that the movement of the Spartans from the position by Gargaphia was towards the Pass No. 2, with the ultimate intention of reaching the *νῆσος* by the *ὑπωρέη* of Kithæron. N.B., that only a part of the first part even of this movement was ever carried out. What then do I allege to be their course? They moved from the Asopus ridge in a south-south-east direction through the *κολῶνοι*, through which it will be seen from the map they would pass to the brook A5, which I fancy to be the Moloeis. Here they waited for Amompharetus, who overtook them before the attack took place, as Herodotus says. From here they proceeded to make their way to the *ὑπωρέη*, as indicated by Herodotus, the nearest point of which would be the bare rocky ground on which Kriekouki now stands, and which part of the *ὑπωρέη* would lead them directly to the mouth of pass No. 2. This ground they never reached: they were overtaken by the Persians, apparently on the flattish expanse of ridge 2, and on this ground the great decisive struggle of the whole battle took place.* But

The retrograde movement of the Spartans.

* In Plutarch, Arist. xi., we meet with a topographical detail which presents considerable difficulty. Plutarch says: *τῶν ὕσιῶν πλησίον ὑπὸ τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα ναός ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πάνυ Δῆμητρος Ἐλευσίνας καὶ Κόρης προσαγορευόμενος. Εὖθὺς οὖν παραλαβὼν τὸν Ἀριστεῖδην ἤγει ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, εὐφυέστατον ὅντα παρεῖδει φάλαγγα πεζικὴν ἵπποκρατονούμενοι, διὰ τὰς ὑπωρείας τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος ὑφίππα ποιούσας τὰ καταλήγοντα καὶ συγκυροῦντα τὸν πεδίον πρὸς τὸ ιερόν. Αὐτοῦ δὲ ἦν καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἥρφον ἔγγυς, ἐλσεὶ πυκνῶν καὶ συσκιῶν δένδρων περιεχόμενον.*

Now the temple or site which I have referred to might, I think, be described as near what I take to be the site of Hysiae. It might even, owing to the height of Kithæron, be described as underneath that mountain. With respect to the rest of the description, it must be remembered that Aristides was taken to this place from the first Greek position near Erythræ. Now, if both Plutarch's account be correct, and my conjecture as to the position of the temple of Demeter be correct also, the part of the *ὑπωρέη* referred to would be that part of ridge 1 on which Kriekouki now stands. It is when we come to the *ἥρφον*, and its position as here given, that the difficulty arises. One has to stretch the language of Plutarch until it cracks in order to reconcile his topography with that of Thucydides, and this, too, supposing Hysiae be where I place it. The only

Let us take Herodotus' account in detail of the events which followed the halt of Pausanias on the Moloeis.*

καὶ οἱ τε ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀμομφάρετον παρεγίνοντο σφι.

Amompharetus, then, joined Pausanias.

καὶ ἡ ἵππος ἡ τῶν βαρβάρων προσέκειτο πᾶσα.

Thus the Spartans were hampered and never attained the *ὑπερέη*, on which Kriekouki stands. Herodotus then says that the cavalry, seeing the former position (on the Asopus ridge) of the Greeks vacant, pressed forward and attacked them. Then come important words:† *Μαρδόνιος δὲ ὡς ἐπύθητο τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀποχόμενους ὑπὸ νύκτα εἰδέ τε τὸν χῶρον ἔρημον.*

This shows that the Spartans *must* have occupied the Asopus ridge. Had they been on the low ground actually on the Spring

way, I think, in which we can judge of the matter is by taking into consideration the circumstances connected with Plutarch's account.

He was a Boeotian. It is in the highest degree probable that he had seen the ground, because he must have used the road from Thebes to Athens. Being a biographer, however, not an historian, he may not have thought, nay, he evidently did not think it necessary to deal intimately with the topography of the battle. There is very little topographical detail of any kind given by him. No mention is made of the *νῆσος*, either directly or indirectly—a most strange omission if he did know the ground well. I cannot but think that he is mistaken; nor is his mistake hard to account for. His work is, of course, second-hand. He may have misread his authority, or his authority may have been a bad one.

There is, of course, a point on which he comes into conflict with Herodotus, where he speaks of *τὰς ὑπερέας . . . ἄφικτα ποιούσας τὰ καταλήγοντα καὶ συγκυροῦντα τοῦ πεδίου πρὸς τὸ ιερόν*, whereas Herodotus describes a cavalry attack as having taken place on this ground. Furthermore, I think that the words of Herodotus in describing the first phase of the second position of the Greeks as “near the Spring of Gargaphia and the *τέμενος* of Androcrates the Hero, through hills of no great height and level country,” can only mean that the *τέμενος* was on the left of the Greek line, for the *ἀπέδος χῶρος* can only be the plain between Platæa and the Thespian Asopus, on which, by-the-bye, according to Thucydides the *τέμενος* must have stood. How, then, can the *τέμενος* be described as near the temple of Demeter, if the latter was near Hysiae?

Col. Leake says, in reference to this point: “It is scarcely worth while to advert to the particulars in which the other ancient authors, who have related this great event, differ from Herodotus: Diodorus and Plutarch lived so long afterwards that they cannot have much weight against the testimony of the contemporary historian; the former, however, does not deviate from it in any important point, and the contradictions of the latter are undeserving of much respect, as being those of a Boeotian angry with Herodotus for having spoken freely of the disgraceful conduct of his countrymen, and thinking no mode of exculpation so effectual as that of throwing general discredit on the historian's accuracy.” (‘Travels in N. Greece,’ vol. ii. p. 353.)

* Herod. ix. 57.

† Ib. ix. 58.

of Gargaphia, their position would not have been visible from where Mardonius presumably was, *i.e.*, beyond the Asopus, since it was immediately *after* this that he led his Persians *across* that stream. For Herodotus says that, on seeing this, he asked the *Aleūdæ* how this retreat squared with their account of the Spartans, and then come the words: * *ταῦτα εἴπας ἦγε τοὺς Πέρσας δρόμῳ διαβάντας τὸν Ἀσωπὸν κατὰ στίβον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς δὴ ἀποδημοκόντων, ἐπεῖχε τε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τε καὶ Τεγεάτας μούνους· Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὅχθων οὐ κατώρα.*

He would pass up out of the valleys of A2 or A3, and across the Asopus ridges. This is confirmed by the fact that he did not see the Athenians in the plain, who would be hidden by that part of the Asopus ridge which runs north from the *ναὸς Ἰωάννης*. Of the course taken by the Athenians I shall speak for clearness' sake later.

The Lacedæmonians then send a message for help to the Athenians. Then they are attacked by the Persians from behind a barrier of shields with bow and arrow. For some time the Greeks suffer severe losses without moving, since the sacrifices are unfavourable. Pausanias turns towards the *Heræum* of Platæa and calls upon the goddess, and while he is doing this the Tegeans charge the Persians. Moreover, immediately after his prayer the Lacedæmonian sacrifices become favourable. The combat then becomes a hand-to-hand one, and an obstinate struggle takes place: † *παρ' αὐτὸν τὸ Δημήτριον.*

The struggle would seem to have taken place at the north or bottom end of ridge 2 and along the valleys of A4 and A5, on either side of Long Ridge, on which is the site which I conjecture to be that of the *τέμενος* of Eleusinian Demeter.

It is to be noticed that this fight took place out of sight of the Greek centre which had fled to Platæa, as is evidenced by the words in which Herodotus describes the receipt of the news of the battle by the latter: † *ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ γυνομένῳ φόβῳ ἀγγέλεται τοῖς ἀλλοισι Ἑλλησι τοῖσι τεταγμένοισι περὶ τὸ Ἡραῖον καὶ ἀπογενομένοισι τῆς μάχης, ὅτι μάχη τε γέγονε καὶ νικῆσεν οἱ μετὰ Πανσανιέω.*

This fact, taken in conjunction with the contours of the ground, shows with a certain amount of accuracy where the fight must have taken place. The Lacedæmonians' left must have been near the head of stream A4 and their front have extended in a south-east direction towards A5.

To continue the description of the fight, Herodotus tells of the obstinacy of the struggle, of the death of Mardonius, and of the

* Herod. ix. 59.

† Ib. ix. 62.

‡ Ib. ix. 69.

rout and flight of the Persians which immediately succeeded, and then came the words: * ἐν δὲ Πλαταιῆσι οἱ Πέρσαι ὡς ἐτράποντο ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔφενγον οὐδένα κόσμον ἐσ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἔωντῶν καὶ ἐσ τὸ τεῖχος τὸ ξύλινον τὸ ἐποιήσαντο ἐν μοίρῃ τῇ Θηβαΐδι. Θώμα δέ μοι ὅκως παρὰ τῆς Δῆμητρος τὸ ἀλσος μαχομένων οὐδὲ εἰς ἐφάνη τῶν Περσέων οὔτε ἐσελθὼν ἐσ τὸ τέμενος οὔτε ἐναποθανων, περὶ τε τὸ ἱρὸν οἱ πλεύστοι ἐν τῷ βεβήλῳ ἔπεσον. δοκέω δέ, εἰ τι περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δεῖ, ἡ θεός αὐτῆς σφεας οὐκ ἐδέκετο ἐμπρήσαντας [τὸ ἱρὸν] τὸ ἐν Ἐλευσίνι ἀνάκτορον.

Now it would seem that the valleys of streams A4 and A5 are the natural courses which the Persians would take in their flight to their camp, and to the wooden fortification. Then comes a remarkable fact mentioned by Herodotus on which I rely strongly as evidence in favour of my hypothesis as to the position of the *τέμενος* of Eleusinian Demeter. He says that none of the Persians entered into or died in the *τέμενος*, but the majority fell in the unconsecrated ground round the temple. Now if the *τέμενος* of Eleusinian Demeter were in the position in which I believe it to have been this is exactly what would have happened.

Herodotus, as is his way, ascribes the curious fact to divine intervention, but the nature of the ground is quite enough to account for it. It would have been very strange if men flying for their lives in a panic rout had taken the steep ascent to the temple in their path, instead of one of the stream valleys, which afford a comparatively easy road of escape, and which led directly towards the position of the camp and the *τεῖχος*; I venture to think that this incidental fact mentioned by Herodotus is, as I have said, a very strong confirmation of the hypothesis I have put forward respecting the position of the temple.

The movement of the Athenians. Let us now return to the Athenians. They apparently started about the same time as the Lacedæmonians. Their course can, I think, be traced with fair certainty. We hear that Mardonius, when he advanced with his infantry against the retreating Spartans, did not see the Athenians who had turned towards the plain, † ὑπὸ τῶν ὅχθων. This high intervening ground I have identified with the north extension of the Asopus ridge from the ναὸς Ἰωάννις. I have also mentioned that there are grounds for, and a certain amount of probability in, the conjecture that the Greek left and centre, before the movement to the *νῆσος* was determined on, had taken refuge on this north extension of the Asopus ridge. The Athenians then followed probably the course of stream A1,

* Herod. ix. 65.

† Ib. ix. 59.

marching on the west side of it. We are then told that Pausanias, on being attacked by the Persian cavalry, sent an urgent message to the Athenians to come to his assistance: * ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἐπόθυντο, ὅρμέατο βοηθέειν καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐπαμύνειν· καὶ σφι ἥδη στείχουσι ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἀντιταχθέντες Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος γινομένων, ὅπει μηκέτι δύνασθαι βοηθῆσαι.

The attack of the Medised Greeks upon the Athenians took place after the latter had turned towards the place where the Spartans were being harassed by the Persian cavalry, which was somewhere near brook A5. Probably the Athenians turned from the plain up A1 past its source at the Spring of Apotripi, and the Medised Greeks overtook them somewhere in this neighbourhood, they having started later, but having come along the chord of the arc of the Athenian march, *i.e.*, having come straight across Asopus Ridge. I think it is probable that this fight took place in the hollow by the spring of Apotripi. Of this fight Herodotus tells us † τὸν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος ἐθελοκακέοντων Βοιωτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοισι ἔμαχόσαντο χρόνον ἐπὶ συχιόν.

When these Boeotians fled, they fled, says Herodotus, to Thebes, not by the way which the Persians and the general body of the other (Persian) allies fled. A glance at the map will show that their natural line of flight would be as described, viz. across the Asopus ridge, across the river itself, and then along the Platea-Thebes road.

I shall not speak of the Persian retreat in detail: I have already indicated what certainly seems to me to be the line or lines along which it went. The *τεῖχος* Vischer conjectures to have been on the far, or north side of the Asopus. This was probably the case, though I do not see anything in Herodotus' account by which we might determine its position, save that we may gather from what he says that it was near Scolus. I will now turn to The Greek centre which had remained by the Heraeum at Platea centre. during all this fighting. Herodotus says: ‡ ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ γινομένῳ φόβῳ ἀγγέλλεται τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἑλλησι τοῖσι τεταγμένοισι περὶ τὸ Ἡραῖον καὶ ἀπογενομένοισι τῆς μάχης, ὅτι μάχη τε γέγονε καὶ νικῶν οἱ μετὰ Πανσαιίειν· οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα, οὐδένα κόσμον ταχθέντες, οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ Κορινθίους ἐτράποντο διὰ τῆς ὑπωρέης καὶ τῶν κολωνῶν τὴν φέρουσαν ἄνω ιθὺ τοῦ ἵρου τῆς Δήμητρος, οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Μεγαρέας τε καὶ Φλασίους διὰ τοῦ πεδίου τὴν λειωτάτην τῶν ὁδῶν. ἐπείτε δὲ ἀγχοῦ τῶν πολεμίων ἐγίνοντο οἱ Μεγαρέες καὶ Φλασίοι, ἀπιδόντες σφέας οἱ Θηβαίων ἵππόται ἐπειγομένους οὐδένα κόσμον ἥλαννον ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τὸν ἵππον, τῶν

* Herod. ix. 61.

† Ib. ix. 67.

‡ Ib. ix. 69.

ιππάρχες Ἀσωπόδωρος δὲ Τιμάνδρον. ἐσπεσόντες δὲ κατεστόρεσαν αὐτῶν ἔξακοσίους, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς κατήραξαν διώκοντες ἐς τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα.

Here again the account of Herodotus supports my hypothesis, as to the position of the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. It will be seen that the path taken by the Corinthians through the *ὑπαρέη* and the hills, *i.e.* over ridges 3 and 4 would lead, as Herodotus describes it, straight to the temple of Demeter, whereas the smoother road along the plain would be a roundabout way. It was probably near the brook A1, or between that stream and O1, that the Boeotian cavalry fell on the unfortunate Megarians and Phliasians, and did them so much damage, and it would be probably up ridge 5 that they fled to Kithæron, with the Boeotian cavalry after them, as Herodotus describes. Had they gone up ridge 4 or ridge 3, the Boeotian horse could not have followed them in the way that Herodotus seems to imply by the words, *τὰς δὲ λοιποὺς κατήραξαν διώκοντες ἐς τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα*.

Here then ends the account of the battle as far as the topography of the ground is concerned, and all that remains for me to do is to sum up briefly my views as to the position of the Greeks, separating the statement of them from the mass of argument in which they have been necessarily involved.

My views put briefly, then, are:—

(a) That the first position of the Greeks was, as to their right, on the high bastion, their centre on the low ground between the bastion and ridge 1, and their left at the foot or on the slope of ridge 1.

(b) That the second position had what I have spoken of as three developments:—

1. That the Greek right took up a position near the Spring of Gargaphia not on the Asopus ridges, while the left was near the *τέμενος* of Androcrates.
2. That there was a further movement of the whole line, the right taking up position on the Asopus ridges and the left on the Thespian Asopus.
3. That the left and centre took to the higher ground of the north extension of the Asopus ridge, when their position in the plain became untenable.

(c) That the Greek right, or Spartans and Tegeans, fell back from Asopus ridge to stream A5, and were beginning the ascent of ridge 2 when forced into the engagement with the Persian horse and, subsequently, foot.

That the left (Athenians) marched along the plain parallel and

close to A1, and when summoned to help the Spartans turned towards the sources of A1, near which the Bœotians attacked them. The centre fled along the plain to the Herœum at Platæa.

Now I think I can claim that I have taken the whole of the account given by Herodotus, and that I have not shirked any point in his description which could possibly throw light on the various situations because it does not happen to square with my own account of the topography. I have ventured on several suggestions as to motives, and several as to facts; here again I think I may claim to have avoided groundless conjectures. I have said but little comparatively of the many commentaries which have been written on the account given by Herodotus. Nearly all of them raise difficulties where no difficulties exist, and give as final explanations much that is quite irreconcilable with either history or topography.

If anyone ever should take the trouble to follow the argument in this paper, he will see, I think, that the only major difficulty in Herodotus' account is in respect to the second position of the Greeks. The Greek left cannot have been at the *τέμενος* of Androcrates and on the Thespian Asopus at the same time. The Asopus mentioned first in relation to this position is as I have said apparently A1, that mentioned later in the cavalry attack is the Thespian Asopus. There is here then some omission in Herodotus' account, and other omissions of much the same kind are noticeable. But whether the elucidation which I have attempted of the topography of the battle be accepted or not, it does show that one man, at any rate, after carefully examining the ground has been unable to detect any single positive statement made by Herodotus which is not reasonably explicable by, and in accord with, the present state of the field.

Forgive my adding one more remark of a purely personal nature. It may occur to some one that I have spent a good deal of time and money on a minor and comparatively unimportant question of Greek history. This does not seem so to me, and for the following reason:—I am but the veriest amateur in the study of ancient history, but it has occurred to me, as it must have occurred to nearly every other reader of Herodotus, that any possible comparison of his narrative with facts ascertainable at the present day would be valuable as furnishing a student of his history, or, at any rate, of the Greek portion of it, with some sort of criterion as to his credibility and reliability in the relation of events which can no longer be subjected to such a test. Now his

account of the Battle of Platæa is more elaborate and detailed than the account of any other event mentioned in his history, and is also perhaps more than any other of those events capable of affording the criterion which seemed to me, at least, to be desirable. Such is my plea for the expenditure of the time, which was my own, and of the money, the major portion of which was furnished by the Royal Geographical Society and the University jointly, on this question of Platæa. I need hardly say that the strategical question was of the keenest interest to me also, so much so, that when once I had begun to work on the ground, I worked thirteen to fifteen hours out of the twenty-four without any other feeling than that of the most absorbing interest.

APPENDIX A.

—♦—

I have purposely added this note in the form of an appendix, not because I consider an appendix a necessary adornment to this monograph, but because the note deals with matter which is, and must probably ever remain, conjecture, though not groundless conjecture. I have already mentioned what I believe to be the kind of source from which Herodotus drew his account of the battle, namely, as I have said, from some intelligent observer who was present at the battle, but whose position in the army was not such as to render him cognizant of the plans of those in superior command. I think that anyone who reads Herodotus' account carefully must be struck with this point. This fact would, it seems to me, account for the entire absence of any mention in Herodotus of any design on the part of the Greek generals. Two motives are continually brought forward for the movement of the Greek force, viz., the want of water, and the damage caused by the Persian cavalry, the very motives, I venture to think, which would suggest themselves to the observation of the kind of informant from whom, I fancy, Herodotus got his account. It is hardly possible to believe that there was a complete absence of design in the operations on the field, or that the movements and general conduct of the battle were dictated by these circumstances alone. So far from believing anything of the sort, I think that we have in Herodotus' account the means of forming a very fairly probable conjecture as to the general plan of the Greek commanders, and as to the causes other than those mentioned by Herodotus, which brought about the various modifications in this design.

In the first place then, the very fact of the Greek force advancing over Kithæron, apart from any other circumstance, shows that the Greeks intended to assume the offensive. They march over Druos Kephalai to take up the first position at Erythræ, à cheval, as I think is plain, of the main direct road from Athens to Thebes. May it not then have been their intention to make a bold push on Thebes itself, and thus strike a decisive blow at the Persian base of operations? May not the existence of the *reîxos* across their path have caused them to give up this design? Subsequent events are in favour of the hypothesis. They move to the second position, through which apparently the other great road to Thebes which crossed the field, viz., that from Platæa, passed. This looks very like an attempt to carry out their original design by the only alternative route open to them. They take up a preliminary position, and then the left, as Herodotus' account indicates, though does not state, advances along this road towards the Asopus. But the Persians have discovered this movement and have moved too. Even the details of the position taken up support this conjecture. The Spartans did not apparently take up a position on Asopus ridge until the left had

reached the river, for Herodotus' words seem to indicate that the Greek force when it *first* took up the second position was not in view of the Persian camp. May we not suppose that the Spartans did not wish to be seen until the movement on the left of the line was completed? The Greeks, thus forced by the Persians, are prevented from engaging on the offensive by the unsatisfactory character of the omens. Day after day passes, and the Greeks, whose fear of the Persian cavalry had probably been temporarily allayed by their success before Erythræ, find that after all their original estimate of the formidable character of that arm of the Persian force was only too correct. Then it would seem that a change came over the designs of the Greek generals, a change evidently forced on them, as it has been forced on many other generals in similar circumstances, by their utter lack of cavalry. Of the Greeks present at the battle on either side, all the states which could supply cavalry were on the Persian side.

[Refer to the list given by Thucydides in Book II. of the allies on either side at the beginning of the Persian war, and the nature of the force contributed by each.] *peloponnesian*

The position of the army was most serious, as Herodotus' brief but emphatic description shows. The design of advancing towards Thebes was apparently given up, and the Greek generals decided to withdraw their men to the nearest part of the *ὑπωρέη*, viz., the *νῆσος* between the two branches of the Oerœ, and also to relieve the provision train which was blocked up in pass No. 2 (Platæa-Athens). Neither of these movements were carried out. The Spartans on the right started to relieve the pass, but were delayed in the first instance by having to wait for the *λόχος* of Amompharetus, and secondly, by the attack of the Persian cavalry. Then comes the great fight with the Persian infantry, the overthrow of the latter, and its retreat down the valleys A4 and A5, to the camp and *τείχος*. The Athenians meanwhile, who had taken the way to the *νῆσος* leading along the plain, probably in order that they might march quickly so as to make up for the time lost in consequence of their distrust of the Spartans, and the delay of the latter, receive an urgent summons to assist the Spartans. They march to the aid of the latter, but are themselves attacked by the Boeotians, whom, after an obstinate struggle, they defeat and drive back.

The centre had fled to Platæa. If the path they must have taken be noticed, it will be easily understood how the Athenians and Spartans might easily be led to suppose that the centre had gone straight to the *νῆσος*.

Then comes the attack on the *τείχος*; its capture; the collection of the spoil and the burial of the dead. They then proceed to carry out what I believe to have been their original design, viz., the march on Thebes, though the main strategic motive of the original design was no longer existent. 'Ως δ' ἄρα ἔθαψαν τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν Πλαταιῆσι οἱ Ἑλληνες, αὐτίκα βουλευομένοισι σφι ἐδόκεε στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς Θήβας ὡς δέ σφι ταῦτα ἔδοξε, οὗτω δὴ ἐνδεκάτη ἡμέρῃ ἀπὸ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀπικόμενοι ἐποιώρκεον Θηβαίους.

APPENDIX B.

On certain Questions connected with existing Maps of the Upper Parasopia.

In the map of Platæa given in Leake's 'Northern Greece,' and also in his account of the visit he paid to the field, the brook A6 is called the Asopus, and he speaks of the main stream as the "Thespian" Asopus. I cannot discover what is his authority for thus naming brook A6. From inquiries on the spot I could not find that it was known to anybody by that name. Whenever one inquired for the Asopo Potamo, the natives invariably pointed to what is conspicuously the main stream.

In Leake's general map of this portion of Boeotia, the battle-field of Leuctra is, possibly owing to a printer's error, misplaced. It is there located in the valley lying north of its real position.

In the map of Greece, published by the Militär Geographisches Institut in Vienna (sheet vii.), the Asopus River is called Oropus. It would be interesting to know whether the authority for this nomenclature is ancient or modern. I have been unable to discover it. Dr. Merethides of Krikouki had never heard the river called by that name.

In this above-mentioned Austrian map the passes which I have numbered 1 (Druos Kephalai) and 2 are clearly marked.

APPENDIX C.

Concerning the Account of the Battle given by Diodorus.

From what authorities other than Herodotus Diodorus drew his account of the battle is not now ascertainable. Writing, as he did, four centuries and a half after the events which he relates took place, his evidence cannot be looked upon as possessing the reliability of the evidence of the earlier author, who, we may certainly suppose, had, and made use of, the opportunity of questioning and examining men who were actually present at the action. I do not propose to do much more than tabulate the points of resemblance and difference in the two accounts.

(1.) He, like Herodotus, says that the first position of the Greeks was near Erythrae.*

(2.) He represents the Persian force as having been at Thebes when the news of the Greek advance into Boeotia reached Mardonius. Herodotus does not say this, but he does, of course, give an account of a banquet at Thebes, somewhere about this time, at which the principal Persians were present.†

(3.) His account of the first cavalry attack of the Persians differs from

* Diod. xi. 29.

† Ib. xi. 30.

that of Herodotus in certain details. He seems to represent the Athenians as having been the first to be attacked, but he also represents them as subsequently extricating the Megarians from their dangerous position.

(4.) He mentions, more emphatically, perhaps, than Herodotus, the feeling of elation and confidence among the Greeks at the defeat of the Persian horse and death of Masistius, whom, however, he does not name.

(5.) He mentions the movement to the second position, the description of which corresponds very well with what I think, from the description of Herodotus, the locality of that position must have been. He says: *ἢν γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν δεξιῶν γεώλοφος ὑψηλός, ἐκ δὲ τῶν εὐωνύμον δὲ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμός.* The high hill he speaks of I take to be the Asopus ridge.

(6.) The rest of his narrative seems to be a version of Herodotus' account of the last great fight which took place in the course of the movement to the *νῆσος*. Consequently, there is a large gap in the narrative given by Diodorus.*

There is one point in this part of his narrative which, as may be imagined by those who have read Appendix A, has attracted my attention. He represents the Greeks as taking the offensive in a more emphatic way than we should gather to have been the case, did we take the account of Herodotus without reading between the lines of it.

I have purposely omitted to urge this point in that appendix, because I think that Herodotus' account, taken by itself, is sufficient evidence for the conjecture I have thus put forward, and I did not wish to introduce into that statement of my views arguments founded on what seems to me to be a somewhat mutilated second-hand account of events.

APPENDIX D.

Concerning the Account of the Battle given in Plutarch 'Aristides.'

The account of the operations of the army as a whole, in so far as it is given, follows closely the account of the same events given by Herodotus, and is, apparently, largely taken from his narrative. It is noteworthy, however, that all that Herodotus says relating to the *νῆσος* is omitted, and a doubt is expressed as to the accuracy of his statement with regard to the part which the Greek centre played in the decisive portion of the struggle. The reasons given for this doubt, however, would seem to indicate that Plutarch had not fully estimated the significance of this part of Herodotus' narrative. That Plutarch did not rely wholly on Herodotus in writing the account of the operations of the army is distinctly shown by his reference to Kleidemus for an unimportant and not very probable detail.† Still his narrative, in so far as it relates to the events mentioned by Herodotus, coincides very closely with the account of the latter. I have referred to the topographical details which

* Diod. xi. 30, 31.

† Plut. Arist. xix.

Plutarch mentions in the course of my attempted examination of Herodotus' account.

As to the personal details which Plutarch gives, with respect to the part played by Aristides in the course of events, they do not seem to me to affect, save in one passage, where a topographical point is introduced, the main purpose of my paper. The total omission of any mention, save in the catalogue of the troops, of so prominent a man as Aristides by Herodotus is curious, undoubtedly, but there are other omissions of equal importance in his account. I think I have already sufficiently shown that I do not, after examining the ground, consider that account to be free from errors of omission. I do, however, believe it to be, in so far as it can now be tested, free from sins of commission.

APPENDIX E.

Some Notes on Modern Publications connected with the Topography of Platea.

I have already referred to the views expressed by Vischer* and Leake,† with respect to the position of the *νῆσος*, and it will be seen that the spring which I identify as Gargaphia corresponds with the one which Leake has pointed out. I have not, however, referred largely to these commentaries for two reasons—

(1.) I wished to examine the ancient authorities by themselves, banishing as far as possible, any prejudice which might be formed in my mind by the study of modern authorities.

(2.) I gather from what both Vischer and Leake says in their accounts that the time they spent on the ground was not sufficient even for a man with the most practised eye to form anything like a final judgment on the minute topographical questions connected with it.

There is, however, a more recent account of the field which seems to me to be entitled to much more serious consideration than those of either the above-mentioned authorities, I mean that given in the *American Journal of Archæology*, 1890, p. 460, by Mr. Irving Hunt. Mr. Hunt has apparently spent some time at Platæa itself as one of the members of the American School of Archæology engaged in superintending the excavation on the site of the ruins of the town. How much of his time he devoted to the study of the battle-field he does not say. At any rate Mr. Hunt had peculiar opportunities for examining the ground. A slight map of the field is added at the end of the volume; it is, however, on a very small scale, and does not mark any natural features at all save the streams.

It may be a prejudice on my part, still I confess that I have no great faith

* 'Erinnerungen und Eindrücke aus Griechenland.'

† 'Northern Greece.'

in topographical detail which is not founded on the evidence of detailed survey. There is nothing in Mr. Hunt's account which can lead the reader to suppose that it is founded on such evidence. I also venture to think that, though Mr. Hunt has followed closely the main facts given by Herodotus, he has failed somewhat to notice much incidental information which may be gleaned here as elsewhere in Herodotus' histories from the minute points of the expressions used in describing events. But, when all is said, Mr. Hunt has had a special opportunity of examining the ground, and it is in the highest degree unlikely that he failed to make good use of it. His discretion has, I see, been much greater than my own, in that he has been content to leave certain important points in connection with the topography of the field in the state in which he found them. His language at any rate does not indicate dissent from, though, on the other hand he does not commit himself strongly to the views of previous commentators. He seems to accept the position of Erythræ as indicated by Leake, though he does not give grounds, as far as I can see, for so doing. Still it is surely impossible to speak of Erythræ even under this hypothesis, as lying west of Scolus, without using language calculated to mislead the reader very greatly as to the site in which he would place it. He seems to accept Leake's *νῆσος*: I say "seems" advisedly, for his language leaves the matter very open. He accepts in a general way Leake's identification of the Spring of Gargaphia.

The point, however, in his paper with which I wish to deal at length, is his determination of the site of the Temple of Eleusinian Demeter. He places it on high ground south-east of Platæa, where are the foundations of a large Byzantine church, six minutes' walk east of the Spring of Vergutiani. Now over the ground Mr. Hunt refers to six minutes' walk could not be at most more than 500 or 600 yards. He says that it is probable that the *τρόπαιον* erected by the Greeks was near the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. With this conjecture I cordially agree. He then quotes Pausanias, who tells us: * *τρόπαιον δὲ ὁ τῆς μάχης τῆς Πλαταιῶσιν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἑλληνες, πεντεκαίδεκα σταδίοις μᾶλιστα ἐστηκεν ἀπωτέρω τῆς πόλεως.* N.B.—That this distance is measured from the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, which Pausanias describes as having been not far from the graves of those who fell at Platæa, and Pausanias indicates by his words at the beginning of the next section that the altar was not in the city. Mr. Hunt then states that the *yards* he speaks of is about 15 stades from this point. I wish I could see Mr. Hunt and enquire from him how he makes that out. The point which he so clearly indicates cannot be at most more than 9 stades from what must be, according to Pausanias, the position of the altar, so we have to swallow a discrepancy of nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, in a total distance of less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. I cannot help thinking that Mr. Hunt has not clearly indicated what he means. Taking Herodotus' account of the action near the temple it is impossible to reconcile this position with what he says about the cavalry attack, nor do I see quite how the engagement between such large bodies of men could have taken place on this ground without being visible, or even possibly audible from some part of Platæa. I hope to be able to communicate with Mr. Hunt on this question, for I cannot understand his statement or argument as it at

* Paus. ix. 2. 6.

present stands. Respecting the quotation which he makes from Plutarch Aristides, I have already dealt with this in the main part of my paper. Adhesion to Plutarch's topographical detail, respecting the relative positions of the Heroon of Androcrates and the temple of Demeter, brings Mr. Hunt into direct collision with Stein and Grote, following Vischer and Leake, respecting the front of the second position of the Greeks, makes Thucydides utterly wrong in his statement respecting the position of the Heroon, and also makes it quite impossible to understand Herodotus' account of the operations after the attainment of the second position.||

APPENDIX F.

The Circumstances under which the Survey was made.

The field of Platæa presents peculiar difficulties to the surveyor. Only a very small portion of it, viz., that part which lies between the ruins of Platæa itself, and the River Asopus, is in any sense of the word flat country. The remainder is hilly, or, in part, mountainous; a country of narrow ridges, separated from one another by stream valleys. The ridges are not high, nor the stream valleys very deep, but the continual changes of angle make it necessary for the surveyor to take a very large number of readings in order to arrive at an accurate representation of the contouring of the country. Another and still greater difficulty is the almost complete absence of noticeable sighting points. The country is open plough or vine-land, with olive and thorn trees dotted here and there, each tree very much like the other, which necessitates the continual use of flags, a serious difficulty in a country where the only assistance available is that of peasants, to whom surveying is an awful mystery. I was fortunate, however, in finding a very intelligent Albanian, whom I trained to the work in the course of two days, and whose services I was careful to retain during the whole of my stay in Upper Larasopia.

The survey of the field of Platæa was conducted for the first three days in fine sunny weather. The atmosphere was clear, there was no wind, and the only drawback was the great heat on the rocky slopes of Kithæron.

Then the weather changed, and for the rest of my stay the conditions under which the survey was taken were most unpleasant. Heavy rains, violent winds, snow and sleet made the life of the surveyor a most unhappy one, and rendered the state of the ground which had to be traversed absolutely indescribable. Some idea of the latter may be formed from the fact that my Albanian servant and myself deliberately chose the beds of running streams as our path, whenever they happened providentially to lead in the direction in which we were going.

Of the large map of the battlefield of Platæa, four-fifths were made with the plane-table lent me by the Geographical Society, the contouring being done with an instrument also lent me by the Society, viz., a portable alt-azimuth, made by

Messrs. Carey. The plane-table work was only possible during the intervals of fair weather. I tried to do some work in rain, using a patent water-proof (?) paper, but I found that the heavy rain reduced the paper to a pulp in a very few minutes, and that, when it came to drawing out the plan, the major portion of the lines were illegible, and those that were legible were incorrect. Such work had all to be done over again. The remaining one-fifth of this map was done with the prismatic compass, the conditions of weather being unfavourable to the use of the plane-table. The intense dampness of the ground which was communicated to the atmosphere rendered the work with the compass very laborious. The damp penetrated into the instrument, and it was necessary to unscrew the lenses and wipe them every few minutes.

With respect to the plane-table trial, the following facts may be mentioned with a view to enabling those who are acquainted with the conditions of surveying to form a judgment as to the probable correctness of the map. No position was marked in the map in any case in which the sighting lines formed an angle of less than 45° at their point of intersection. In all such cases I waited until I could obtain a third sight on the point in question. The more intricate parts of the map were surveyed twice.

In the work with the prismatic compass three readings were taken for the determination of each point.

In the contouring readings were taken both up and down wherever possible; I avoided taking readings of small angles wherever they could be avoided, since a difference of half a degree is of much greater significance in such cases than it is when the angles are larger. It will of course be understood by those conversant with surveying, that contours obtained with an instrument for measuring angles cannot claim to possess the mathematical accuracy of those obtained by levelling with the theodolite. The map of the field of Platea took thirteen days and a half of about thirteen hours each, of which eight hours and a half a day were spent in the open. The weather caused much time to be wasted, the more so, as, even when the conditions seemed impossible, it was necessary to be on the ground ready to take advantage of any interval when survey was possible. A small portion of the map, near the Asopus, does not pretend to the same accuracy as the rest of the map. It was impossible to get within a furlong of the river, so awful was the state of the ground, and, unfortunately, there were no trees or other distinctive sighting points on the stream by which its position could be obtained without approaching it. At the same time the position of that portion of the river which is represented by dotted lines, is quite accurate enough for the purpose for which the map was made. The map was on a scale of 8 inches to the mile, or 1 inch to the furlong—R.F. $\frac{1}{750}$. Its contours are at a distance of 5 yards vertical from one another. It has, however, been reduced to a scale of 4 inches to the mile, with contours at an interval of 10 yards vertical. It was not possible to obtain any reading from sea-level, nor was it indeed necessary. The contours are consequently reckoned from the lowest point of the map, viz., the bridge on the Theban Road, over the Asopus River.

The instrument used in the large map of the ruins of Platea was the plane-table. The same precautions were taken as in the case of the map of

the battle-field. The contours were taken with Carey's instrument. The scale of the original map is 50 yards to the inch, on the published map 100. The contours are at an interval of 1 yard vertical. The atmospheric conditions under which the survey was taken were favourable, save for the prevalence of a wind so strong that it nearly brought the survey to an untimely conclusion by blowing the plane-table off one of the bastions of the wall down a steep slope. Fortunately the instruments were not on it at the time, and no damage resulted. The survey took one-and-a-half days in the open. A rough survey had been made of the ground by students from the American School at the time that they were engaged in digging there. I saw the original sketch of it. Comparatively few sights had been taken, and it was on a small scale, without contours; it was, in fact, only intended as a rough plan, and did not, if I remember aright, include much detail. I thought, therefore, that a more detailed plan would be possibly useful.

In the survey of the field of Leuctra the instrument used was the prismatic compass. It was only at the fourth attempt that I succeeded in making any survey at all. On each of the three first occasions my work was stopped by sleet and rain immediately after reaching the field, and I had my 17 miles' walk over tracks, ankle, and, in many cases, nearly knee-deep in mire, for nothing. The actual survey was taken under fairly favourable atmospheric conditions. The state of the ground may best be imagined from the fact that it took my servant and myself forty-five minutes to traverse half a mile of the plain of Leuctra, in the course of which we had to wade the Asopus, which, owing to the heavy rains, was over 3 feet deep in water and mud. The field is a small one, and does not present the same difficulties of contour as Platea. I did not go over the ground twice, because time did not allow of it, but I took a very large number of readings, and (I confess to my surprise) the results, when I came to draw out the map, were accurate. The actual time spent on the survey was one day, the work being done without any break from 7.30 in the morning till 4.30 in the afternoon. The scale is 8 inches to the mile—R.F. $\frac{1}{7500}$. Contours at distances of 5 yards vertical. This scale has been reduced in the printed map, as in the case of the map of the battle-field of Platea.



II.—THE CITY OF PLATÆA.

It would be more or less of a superfluous task to write a detailed account of the site of Platæa after so admirable a description of it has been given in the *American Archaeological Journal* of 1890, by Mr. H. Washington, who was engaged in the excavations carried out there by the American School of Archaeology in 1888–90. He examined the ground, apparently, from the archaeological point of view pure and simple. My own examination was a close one, but was rather undertaken from the historical point of view, and it is this latter difference which makes me think that the results of that examination may be worth the setting forth, despite the existence of this previous and accurate account of the observations which the American explorers made upon the spot. I surveyed the site on a scale of 8 inches to the mile, as part of the battlefield of Platæa, but in that survey I did not include much detail. I subsequently surveyed it again on a scale of 50 yards to the ~~inch~~ ~~site~~. Unfortunately, the part of this survey which dealt with the southern or upper portion of the ground was made under unfavourable circumstances in respect of weather. I had to leave Platæa the next day, before I could draw out that part of the plan, and I found when I came to draw it out that the work was so inaccurate that I have not presented it as part of the larger map.

I should very likely have gone back to do the work over again had I not seen the plan made (on a smaller scale indeed) by the American school. This plan, though on such a scale, represents all the details of building remains which are discernible on that part of the site. It presents even more detail than I could make out at the time of my visit, probably owing to the fact that the American explorers, when living on the site, uncovered wall-foundations, etc., which are now recovered by the earth. This must be the case, for they represent, as certain and distinct, wall,

foundations, the traces of which were very uncertain and indistinct at the time of my visit. In my own plan I have merely inserted positions, foundations, etc., which presented themselves to the eye of the surveyor on the surface unaided by any excavations. More, of course, than this I could not do. It is fortunate that the part of the site which is shown in my larger scale plan is that which, in respect to the remains discernible, is the more interesting portion of the ground.

It includes the whole of what must, I think, have been the site of the city whose siege is described at such length by Thucydides. Mr. Washington apparently thinks that the town besieged covered a larger area than that which I have assigned to it, but he does place it to the north of the first cross wall. I shall not attempt more than a general description of the ground, with special reference to its value as a fortified position. For the archaeological information respecting the sites marked in my map, I am indebted in a great measure to the papers I have referred to.

General description of site.

The site is, then, the flat sloping top of a bastion of Kithæron which extends from the foot of a steep rocky slope, at the base of the highest peak of that mountain, northwards for about two-thirds to three quarters of a mile to that flat alluvial plain which extends from the head streams of the Oeroe to the Asopus. This bastion spreads out as it slopes towards the plain, *i.e.*, is much narrower at the point where it unites with the mountain slope than where it abuts on the level ground. Besides the slope from north to south, there is also an inclination from west to east, the east side, *i.e.*, of the site, is on the whole at lower elevation than the west side, this difference becoming more marked as the bastion approaches the plain. The general surface is not, however, broken by any noticeable depressions, save where, as will be seen on reference to my map, at the north or lower end a valley, and close by it, a depression runs down towards the plain. The higher portion of the site presents, for the most part, a rocky uneven surface, not admitting of cultivation, while the lower part is covered with soil to a considerable depth apparently, and is cultivated throughout, save where the foundations of pre-existing buildings prevent the passage of the plough. There is one point in Mr. Washington's paper from which I must differ. His language seems to imply that he does not consider that the slopes which form the edges of the bastion on the north, east, and west are, or can have been, of such a character as to create a position of some natural strength, capable of being rendered very formidable

by artificial means. Now I cannot but think that when Mr. Washington wrote his account, he did not retain in his memory an accurate idea of those slopes, nor did he form an accurate estimate of the extent to which they must have contributed, when surmounted by walls, towards rendering the town almost impregnable (to such an army as, for instance, the Peloponnesian force), on the north, and the lower parts of, east and west sides. These slopes are steep on all sides, in some parts precipitous, and on these three sides the only points of attack which would offer nought but artificial obstacles, would be those small portions of the circuit walls which traversed the depression and the valley to which I have referred. Now, on reference to the plan of the whole site which is given with this paper, it will be seen that the defensive walls, whose traces are at present discernible, are three in number.

(1) The *enceinte* wall which forms a rough isosceles triangle, whose base is on the north front of the bastion; and whose apex is at the southern or higher end.

(2) The higher cross wall, which Mr. Washington believes to have been built when the extreme southern, or higher portion of the site no longer formed a part of the town.

(3) A lower cross wall, forming, with the north-western portion of the *enceinte* wall, the defence work of the north-western quarter of the bastion, which is, strategically, the strongest portion of the whole ground.

Of these walls, the south angle of the *enceinte* wall is the oldest portion existent. Its continued existence is probably accounted for by Mr. Washington's hypothesis as to the higher cross wall. He thinks that the latter was built when the extreme south angle of the town ceased to be inhabited. The *enceinte* wall at this south angle has consequently not been entirely destroyed, in order to build later and more substantial walls along its line. It is beyond doubt that this has happened several times with regard to older walls on the lower portion of the ground, where the later Platæa, or Platæas stood. This south, or upper position of the site, was probably the position of the town at the time of the battle. As to the position of the town fifty years later, at the time of the siege, the topographical evidence pure and simple does not help us with aught that may be asserted with certainty. Thucydides' account of the siege does.

I have no doubt in my own mind that the town besieged was practically coextensive with the area included in the wall surrounding the north-western portion of the bastion. That which

makes me feel this certainty is this. No one, I think, who reads Thucydides' account, and notices the absence of topographical details, which would most certainly have been given by anyone who had seen the ground whereon the events he was relating took place, can reasonably doubt that Thucydides had never set eyes on the site of Plataea. Yet, in spite of this, in the whole of that long narration of events, and apparently, extraordinary incidents, there is not one single fact mentioned, which is not explicable on the hypothesis that the town besieged stood on this north-western portion of the bastion. If we suppose that the town at the time of the siege stood on the south, or higher portion of the bastion, then much of Thucydides' narrative must be pronounced utterly incomprehensible. If we were to adopt this view, we should have to explain how, by a marvellous and unparalleled series of coincidences, the many incomprehensible facts [or lies] which he narrates are so peculiarly, and so admirably capable of explanation by the hypothesis which we reject.

My belief is that the crowns of the northern and western slopes of the bastion towards the plain, owing to the immensely superior advantages of position which they offered for the lines of fortification over any ground on the south portion of the bastion, were, very early in the history of the town, made the site of an *enceinte* wall.

Changes in the level of the site.

I think that anyone acquainted with the history of Plataea in classical times, will have no difficulty in imagining that any attempt at determining the extent of the city at the various distinct periods of its existence, solely on the evidence obtainable on the ground at the present time, must fail to offer any final solution of the difficulties which face the modern inquirer. My own interest in examining the site centered mainly on the account of the siege of the town by the Peloponnesians, which we have in Thucydides. Before proceeding to take this account in detail, I wish to say a few words as to what may, I consider, be reasonably conjectured as to the changes in the aspect, and, if I may so speak, in the constitution of the site, between the date of the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and the present day. In the first place, then, I cannot but think that the depth of soil on the surface of this rocky bastion, which forms the site, has greatly increased since the time of the siege. The American explorers in their excavations do not seem to have found a greater depth than 3 metres, or about 10 feet, anywhere on the bastion. Now, when we come to consider the number of times that the city

has been destroyed and rebuilt on practically the same ground, we cannot but conjecture that the whole surface is covered to a considerable depth with the remains of the many buildings which formerly stood upon it. Were this not so, the case of Platæa would be an almost unparalleled exception to what is found to be the case with regard to the sites of towns which have had a similar history. That there has been no exception of the kind here is sufficiently proved by the excavations which have been made. A striking example of what I say is afforded by the ground whereon has been discovered that temple foundation which the Americans are disposed to identify as the Heræum spoken of by Herodotus. Here a layer of ashes and burnt earth was found at a depth of several feet beneath the surface, the remains, evidently, of some building which had stood there, and been destroyed by fire. The very plough land which now covers so large a portion of the ground whereon the various towns formerly stood, is probably, to a very large extent, composed of the remains of the adobe brick which must have been largely used in the construction of its buildings, and which would rapidly disintegrate and return to its former state under a comparatively short exposure to the weather. That such brick was used in the construction of the town we know from Thucydides,* and even if he had not mentioned the fact, it might be easily gathered from an observation of the neighbourhood. The whole of the low land in the neighbourhood is composed of a sticky, clayey soil, which is peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of the adobe, or sun-dried brown brick. It will be seen, later, that this question of the depth of soil upon the site is of the greatest importance in reference to Thucydides' account of the siege. A part of the site which would be particularly affected by this accumulation of ruins would be the depression on the north side, to which I have alluded, and which will be distinguished in the contouring of my plan. It must have been much deeper in former times. No stream worth speaking of runs down it, and any earth or *débris* deposited there might remain at practically the same level for centuries. Lastly, the slopes at the north and west sides of the bastion must have been rendered much more gradual in course of time by similar accumulations. The upper part of the slope at the north is at the present day precipitous, but I fancy that the precipitous portion must have been of much greater depth at the time of the siege, and at that time, too, the slopes on the east side of the Acropolis, if I may so call it, of the town, into

* Thuc. ii. 75. 4.

the depression, and on the west side down to the plain, must have been much more formidable from a strategical point of view than they are at the present day.

Extent of the town whose siege is described.

Now, I may repeat that it is this part of the town, which I shall hereafter speak of as the Acropolis, which was, I believe, the town besieged by the Peloponnesians. The walls, the remains of which now surround it, show evidence of having been constructed at a later date, I understand, but contain materials which show the distinctive characteristics of a wall belonging to the period of which I speak, the period i.e. of the siege. More than this, remains of an earlier wall of the second period have been discovered in the south-western corner of this Acropolis. Now, certain commentators on Thucydides have considered the possibility of this, but have rejected it on one of two grounds.

(1) That the space enclosed is utterly inadequate for a town of ten thousand people, the number at which they estimate the population at that period.

(2) That it could not have contained the population together with their flocks, herds, and agricultural implements, even if used merely as a refuge in time of siege.

With respect to the first objection:—

How do these commentators deduce a population of ten thousand from the fact of there being four hundred able-bodied defenders? Under this supposition, that generation of Platæans must have been either embarrassingly prolific, or the town must have been an institution on an imperial scale for the support of the aged and infirm, the *ἀχρεώτατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων* of which Thucydides speaks.

Those who urge the second objection do so under an evident misconception as to the amount of *κατασκεύη*, etc., which the Platæans would have had to store in the town in case of the country being invaded. There is no grazing-land worth mentioning on the plain, and but little on Kitheron, therefore, the amount of live-stock must always have been small. Furthermore, a plough, a pair of oxen, and a hoe or two, would form the average total of the stock-in-trade of the local farmer.

The nature of the evidence.

It must be remembered that in dealing with the town and its position at the time of the siege, we have no evidence to go on, save that afforded by the present remains (evidence which is capable of very diverse interpretation), and that given us by Thucydides, which is peculiarly deficient in topographical detail, pure and simple, and is plainly the evidence of a man who had never seen the place, and was merely relating events which he heard from the

mouths of others. Our judgment must be formed, since we can form it in no other way, on deductions formed from the relation of the events which occurred on the ground as Thucydides recounts them. This account I followed closely on the spot, and it seemed, to me at least, consistent with the actualities and probabilities of the site. Respecting the size of the town, Thucydides tells us that it was "not a large place."* One commentator, wishing to prove the opposite of Thucydides' assertion, says that he must have been comparing it with Athens. This would surely be much the same as a travelled Englishman making the assertion that Brussels is "not a large place," without adding that this meant "relative to the size of such a place as London."

Thucydides tells us further that the number of defenders was four hundred and eighty in all.† Can we suppose that such a number could have defended aught but a comparatively small extent of wall against the numbers of the Peloponnesian force? Dr. Müller Strübing in his paper in Flecheisen's *Jahrbuch* (1885) does not believe anything of the kind. But then he takes the circumference of the walls as having been $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles at the time of the siege, whereas those who have seen the ruins are generally agreed that this $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles represents the circuit of the town at a later date. Mr. Washington and his companions have examined the position with a thoroughness far exceeding that of any other examination which has hitherto been made, and yet they are evidently unable to put forward any decided view as to the extent of the town at the various periods of its existence, from the evidence gained by such an examination. With regard to the east and west walls of the town itself, they belong, Mr. Washington says, to the second and third periods of construction for the most part, but the corner of the east wall near the north-east bastion is of a later date, and similar in construction to the wall-remains on the Acropolis. Did the older parts of these east and west walls exist at the time of the siege? As far as their construction is concerned, they may very well be the walls of the city as restored after the Peace of Antalcidas. If Thucydides is to be believed, they must be so, since the city which the Peloponnesians besieged, was razed to its very foundations by the Thebans a year after its surrender.‡ This passage of Thucydides contains a statement as to the building of a *καταγύρων* near to the Heræum, with details as to its size, structure, etc. Now the American explorers believe, on evidence which is apparently convincing, that they have

* Thuc. ii. 77.

† Ib. ii. 78. 3.

‡ Ib. iii. 68. 4.

actually discovered the traces of this building as described by Thucydides.* This would seem to support the credibility of the statement made earlier in the same passage as to the complete destruction of the town.

After examining the site, and after reading what has been written by competent authorities on the subject, I cannot think that the evidence to be obtained on the spot is, apart from Thucydides, in any way conclusive as to the extent or exact position of the town whose siege he describes. It is unfortunate that such is the case, but it would, I think, taking into consideration the history of the town, be extremely surprising if the case were different. All that one can attempt to do then, is to take the account of Thucydides in detail, and see if it is consistent with any reasonable hypothesis, as to the position of Platæa at the time of the siege. The account must in other words be tested by topographical probabilities, since topographical certainties are not at our disposal.

When I express my belief that the town actually besieged by the Peloponnesians lay on the north-west portion of the site, and was probably fairly co-extensive with what I have spoken of as the Acropolis, I do not assert that all the dwellings of this town lay actually within the walls; but again, as I have said, I do not see that the fact of there having been four hundred able-bodied men in the place capable of active service in its defence necessitates the supposition that the total population amounted to ten thousand, or anything like that number.†

The N.W. portion of the site. Now let me repeat once more what I have already said as to the natural strength of the position of the Acropolis, or north-west portion of the site.

The slopes on the north and west are now steep, in places precipitous, and must have been much steeper in former times. The foundation of an enceinte wall placed upon them would be

* *American Journal of Archaeology*, 1890.

† Certain commentators, e.g., Paley and Müller Strübing, have attacked Thucydides' whole account of the siege operations on the question of the size of the place which the four hundred and eighty successfully defended. They say that the town *must* have been such and such a size, and having begged this question they show the very palpable conclusion that four hundred and eighty men could not have defended the length of wall required to surround a place of the size. I believe I am right in saying that neither Paley nor Müller Strübing have ever seen the site; if they had, they would know that it is quite impossible to say that the extent of the walled town which Thucydides refers to *must* have been so and so.

from 60 to 90 feet above the plain at their base. On the east side is a depression which must have been much deeper in former times. Even on the *ridges* between the depression and the small valley to the east of it, the American excavators found a depth of *débris* of 1 metre. In the depression it must be very considerably greater, probably 4 or 5 metres, or even more. Only on the south side then, and on the south portion of the east side of the Acropolis, would the walls be assailable from the ground on the same level as that whereon they stood, which is, I cannot help thinking, a highly significant fact, when we consider the notorious incompetence displayed by the Peloponnesians at that time in all attacks on walled places, and which would explain how it came to pass that so small a number of defenders was able for so long to repel the attacks of so many assailants; the reason being that those assailants were compelled, owing to the nature of the ground, to attack only a small portion of the *enceinte* wall. I will now give accurate measurement, taken from my map, of the extent of the walls of this Acropolis.

Total circumference of Acropolis wall	1430 yds.
Length of wall on N. and W. sides, i.e., on sides least assailable.	700 "
Total length of wall on S. and E. sides	730 "
Portion of E. wall which would be on the edge of the depression	150 "

730

This would leave 580 yards of wall, which would offer no difficulties of natural position to its assailants, or, if my belief as to the state of the depression at that time be accepted, 580 500 yards.

It is a long stretch of wall to be successfully defended by four hundred and eighty men against immeasurably superior numbers, but we are not faced by an impossibility, or even, if all the circumstances of the assailants and assailed be considered, an improbability.

I will now proceed to take the account of Thucydides in detail. I hope to be able to show that the major and most significant portion of the difficulties, which have been discovered in this account, by such commentators as Paley and Müller Strübing, is quite capable of solution on the spot.*

* Müller Strübing's paper has, I understand, attracted some attention. I can quite believe that it has; its conclusions are convincing, if only the premisses be granted. It is with the latter, especially those founded on the topography of the site, that I shall venture to deal. The opening portion of his paper can be dealt with much more effectively by others than by myself; it is when he descends to detail that he lays himself open to the criticism of smaller

Thucydides ends his account of the attempted seizure of Platea by the Thebans, and the disaster which there happened to the latter, with the words: * "And after this, the Athenians marched to Platea, provisioned the place, and left a garrison, and took away the most useless part of the male population with the women and children."

In the same year, 431 B.C., took place the first inroad into Attica, in which the Boeotians took part, sending their contingent to the army of Archidamus; "with the remainder of their force, however, they went to Platea and ravaged the country."†

The Athenian garrison.

Now, what was the number of this garrison introduced by the Athenians? We have no mention of the withdrawal of any part of it, nor is this any palpable reason for supposing that any part of it was withdrawn before the siege began. If that be the case, and, as far as our information goes, the probability is that it was so, the Athenian garrison introduced amounted to eighty men, the number of Athenians, that is, present at the siege. The Athenians then, must have considered a garrison of four hundred and eighty sufficient at any rate for the defence of Platea under any ordinary circumstances. Now is it conceivable that they could have supposed this, had the walls been as some would assert, over 2 miles in length? The defence of Platea was not a mere matter of sentiment to Athens. Its position strategically was of the utmost importance to her. The only two land passages from Boeotia into Megara direct, without going into Attic territory, are the pass on the Platea-Megara road, and the difficult pass along the coast at the head of the Corinthian Gulf to Egosthena. Now the former of these, which is the most direct, and the most convenient in every way, is commanded by Platea. I do not know whether my reading has been sufficiently wide to permit of my making the statement positively, but I have noticed the fact that I have never come across any mention of the use of the Platea-Megara Pass by any force hostile to the possessors of the position of Platea at the time being. So long then as Athens held Platea the communica-

Immense strategic importance of Platea.

folk like me. Still, I do not think that, if the detail in his paper be shown to be erroneous, the earlier and more general portion of it will be accepted as more than a very ingenious theory as to the manner in which Thucydides wrote his history. That theory does, of course, run directly counter to that which Thucydides emphatically asserts on the subject, and it is a theory which will hardly hold water if it cannot be shown that Thucydides has departed from his expressed purpose and design in the course of his narration of events.

† Thuc. ii. 6.

‡ Ib. ii. 12.

tions between the northern portion of the Lacedæmonian alliance and the Peloponnesians must have been rendered difficult, save when the Peloponnesian force was actually in Attica, or the Isthmus. I think then that we must conclude that the Athenians would have been extremely unlikely to do aught which could endanger their possession of a position so important.

We now come to the actual siege.* “The following summer (B.C. 429), the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica, but marched against Platea under the leadership of Archidamus, etc., etc.” Thucydides does not give us the number of the army.† The number must remain a conjecture: it can never be more than that. At the same time one may say in reference to it that it would seem strange that the Lacedæmonians should have called together as large an army for the attack on a small place like Platea, as for the invasion of Attica, where an attack by the Athenian forces was extremely likely to take place. Surely also the omission to mention the number of troops on an expedition is far too common in Thucydides for us to be able to say that the omission in this instance implies that we are to take the number to be the same as in the inroads into Attica. The force was a large one: Thucydides tells us that, but that does not necessarily imply that it amounted to the extraordinary numbers which Müller Strübing conjectures. Thucydides might well have used the same expression about a force of twenty thousand.‡ “He (Archidamus) having encamped his forces, was on the point of laying waste the country.”

Then comes the protest of the Plateans, Archidamus’ answer, and the second speech of the Plateans, from which we learn that the women and children were still in Athens. §

“After this appeal to the gods, Archidamus opened hostilities, by first running a stockade round Platea formed of felled timber, to prevent anyone getting out of the place from that time forth.” || There would be no difficulty in procuring the timber from

* Thuc. ii. 71.

† Müller Strübing concludes that it was the same size as in the case of the invasion of Attica, i.e., all told, 70,000 to 80,000, if not 100,000.

‡ Thuc. ii. 71. 2.

§ Thuc. ii. 72. 5. Müller Strübing, who follows Bloomfield, seems to think the proposal of the Lacedæmonian king to take the Platean lands in a kind of pawn during the war a most extraordinary one, and highly improbable as an incident of history. But surely, when the importance of the possession of this position during war to the two contending parties is considered, the proposal seems an eminently probable one.

|| Thuc. ii. 75. 1.

Kithæron, and, apart from this fact, there seems, judging from passages in Pausanias and Plutarch and also in Herodotus, to have been a great deal more timber in the plain at that time than there is at the present day.* If the stockade was run, as it probably was, round the north-west fortified quarter of the site as we now see it, it need not have been much more than a mile in circumference, and the ground itself would offer no insuperable difficulties to its construction.

We now come to details of the assault which are, I venture to think, quite incomprehensible, unless the circumstances of the site be taken into consideration. It is possible that the account is exaggerated at this point. Nor would such an exaggeration be surprising, nay, the absence of exaggeration would be almost unnatural. Thucydides must have got his account of the assault either directly, or indirectly, from one of those who escaped from the town, and men who have passed through such perils as the besieged in Platea did pass through, would not be likely to underestimate the extent of the dangers to which they were exposed. The words of Thucydides are as follows:† “And after that they raised a mound towards the town in the hope of capturing it speedily, since so large a force was engaged upon the work. They cut and carried timber from Kithæron, and built it in on either side of the mound, placing it lattice fashion to serve as walls, so that the mound might not spread over a large space. And they brought wood, stones and earth, and everything else whose addition to the mound might contribute to its completion.”

“The work proceeded for seventy days and nights continuously, the workers being divided into reliefs, so that while some worked, the others took food and sleep. The Lacedæmonian officers, too, of each contingent acted as superintendents and kept them to their task. The Plateans seeing the mound rising, constructed a wooden wall, and placing it on that portion of their own wall

* “Strange, indeed,” says Müller Strübing, “that Archidamus should now seek to prevent the garrison from leaving the place after having so recently offered them free departure!” Not so very strange, however, if we consider that the refusal of the Plateans to accept Archidamus’ comparatively moderate proposals would be exceedingly likely to make him lend an ear to the Thebans who, we may be sure, had no idea of letting the garrison escape with their lives if they could possibly prevent it. Müller Strübing further raises a difficulty as to the extent of ground and kind of ground over which this stockade was carried. Of course we must remember that he, in face of what Thucydides says, on topographical evidence which cannot pretend even to probability, assumes the circumference of the town to have been $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

† Thuc. ii. 75. 1 *et seq.*

against which the mound was being raised, built into it bricks, which they took down from the houses near. The timbers served as a framework for the bricks, and prevented the structure becoming weak as its height increased. They were covered, too, with skins and dressed hides, to secure the workers and the wood-work from being struck by fire-bearing arrows. The wall was raised to a great height, but the mound kept pace with it. The Platæans then contrived something of this sort: they cut through the wall at the point where the mound abutted on it, and carried in the earth. The Peloponnesians, on noticing this, rammed clay into wicker baskets and cast them into the gap, so that this clay, not being loose, might not be carried away like the earth. The besiegers, baulked in their plan, desisted from it, but dug a passage underground from the town, and after reckoning the distance and direction required to get under the mound, brought in the earth as before. For a long time those outside did not notice this, so that though they kept casting on material the progress towards completion was slower, their embankment being carried away from underneath, and continually settling into the vacant space. The Platæans, however, fearing lest with such disparity of numbers they would not by this device be enabled to hold out, etc."

This passage presents, I think, the greatest difficulty in Thucydides' account. How was it possible for so small a number of defenders, using the means described, to make a sensible impression over work of such magnitude, carried out by what must have been an immensely superior number of hands? The *τούρδε τι* of Thucydides, shows, I think, that he could not quite understand the tale as told to him. But the explanation lies, I think, in the nature of the ground on which the mound was built. It would, as may be seen, be constructed on that side of the wall where the natural strength of the position was least. It would be built then on the south side, or at the south portion of the east side. Now the depth of earth on this side of the fortified town must have been but very small in those days, and the nearest place from which earth in any quantity could be obtained would be the alluvial plain at the foot of the bastion on which the town stood. This would necessitate a portage of at least 250 or 300 yards up a steep slope. Now the besieged, after breaking through their wall and getting at the earth which abutted on it, would have a portage of from 10 to 15 yards at most, and consequently would be able, supposing four hundred of them worked, to counter-

act the exertions of some four thousand men on the other side. The carriage, however, of the wicker baskets of hard clay would be a much more difficult matter, especially if they were of considerable size, and the very weight of the heaped-up mass of them would prevent the removal of those at the bottom. The second plan of the underground passage would not be so effective (as indeed Thucydides indicates it was not, in the words I have last quoted), because the portage would be longer, since they were now working under the highest portion of the mound, which would probably be some yards from the wall. It is not necessary at all to suppose, if the circumstances be considered, that the *πόρος* was carried through the bed rock. It is far more probable
> that it went through the comparatively soft material of the mound.*

We now come to the relation by Thucydides of the building of the demi-lunes and of the attack on the wall by means of engines. I do not quote the words because the topography does not, of course, either support or refute what is stated. I would call attention, however, to two facts of importance :

(1) This attack seems to have been mainly on that side of the town on which the mound had been raised.

This would be the case, since the walls on the north and west would be practically out of reach of any effective attack of this kind.

(2) The engines do not seem to have been powerful. They do not seem to have damaged aught save the emergency wall.

The Peloponnesians now made preparations for a blockade, but first they tried the attack by fire. Now in the account of this attack occur words of great importance, as showing with a very high amount of probability on which side of the town this attack was made. The words are:† “For within the walls a large portion of the town was unapproachable ; and had there arisen a wind to waft the fire onward, as the enemy expected, they (the Plateans) would not have escaped.”

Now the wind which the enemy expected was almost without doubt the prevalent wind of the district, which is, as might be
> supposed, from Kithæron, *i.e.*, from the south ; therefore, I think
> this attack took place on the south point of the town, where, as
> will be noticed, I believe the mound to have been raised. The
> heavy rain and thunder are not uncommon incidents in that

* Müller Strübing, not knowing the topography of the ground, cannot make out where they got the earth from !

† Thuc. ii. 77. 5.

region in the winter season at any rate. Of the summer I cannot speak.

"The Peloponnesians after this failure, leaving a portion of the army (the majority, however, they dismissed), ran a wall round the city in a circle, distributing the ground among the various states. It had a ditch both inside and outside, from which they took the material for the bricks. And when it was all completed, about the time of the rising of Arcturus, they left guards for half of the wall, the other half being guarded by the Boeotians, and went home with the army and dispersed to their several states."

Then comes a statement of the number of the besieged, viz. :—

400 Plateans.

80 Athenians.

100 women as breadmakers

with an emphatic further statement to the effect that this includes all without exception who were in the place.*

We come now to the account which Thucydides gives of the escape of the two hundred and twelve from Platæa, of which I shall quote such passages as have a bearing on the topography of the siege.† Thucydides tells us that owing to food-supply running short, and despair of assistance from Athens, the whole garrison formed a plan to escape over the blockader's work, but afterwards half of the whole number drew back from the attempt in view of the great risk, and the number which actually did face it was two hundred and twenty. This would leave, without allowing for casualties, etc., in the course of the siege, two hundred and sixty defenders in the town. These latter, then, if we are to believe Thucydides, considered the danger of remaining less than that risk which would be incurred in attempting to

* Müller Strübing makes a great difficulty about the time in which this great wall was built, and very naturally, too, since he supposes the city to have been $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in circumference. Why make such a fuss about details? Would not Thucydides' express statement that 480 men defended this length of wall be quite sufficient to damn his whole narrative as untrue, without driving the nail further home? Mr. Müller Strübing, after a glance at the map, decides also that the brick-making from the ditch must be all a lie. "Clay," says he, "out of which the wall could be built, was not at hand, that we know." I should like to walk Mr. Müller Strübing over that plough land round Platæa on a rainy day. He would be able to take a fair though formless adobe brick off his boots between every step he made. Let anyone examine the course which the stream flowing beneath the north-east bastion of Platæa has cut, and he will soon see that the subsoil as well as the surface is all clay.

† Thuc. iii. 20.

escape. What consideration other than the length of wall which had to be defended, had weight with them we do not know, but if we accept this passage of Thucydides as true, we have in this fact of their remaining a most emphatic piece of evidence as to the limited extent of wall assailable.*

"They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall, arriving at the measure by calculating the number of layers of bricks at a point where the wall was not thoroughly covered with whitewash on the near side. A number of them counted the layers simultaneously, of whom some were sure to make a miscalculation, but the majority to be accurate, especially as they counted many times over and were not far off, nay, the wall was well in sight for the purpose they wished."

Some commentators have cast doubt on this passage, from their inability to understand why such care was necessary in calculating the length of the ladders, and have attributed its preciseness of detail to a striving after theatrical effect. The reason for the care taken was simple enough. The wall had to be crossed promptly by a considerable number of men. Had the ladders been too short by a yard or so, the difficulty of climbing at the top would have immensely delayed the passage. Had they been too long, the guards at the part of the wall, if aroused, would have been able to lay hold of them and thrust them back.†

We get also from this passage a very fairly close idea of the distance of the blockading wall from that of the town. Testing the facts by my own sight, which is good, I reckon it to have been between 80 and 100 yards off.

We then have the detailed description of the besieger's wall. It was, from Thucydides' account, a considerable work.‡ Its length would be about a mile, I reckon. It must have been carried over the mound which the besiegers had raised in the early part of the siege, and this would account for the fact of all trace of the ditches having been lost. Otherwise they would have been cut in the solid rock, a difficult work, traces of which would probably be discernible at the present time. Then comes the account of the passage of the wall by the fugitives.§ The words "and first they crossed the ditch which enclosed them, and then approached the enemy's wall," seem to indicate that there was a space between the

* Thuc. iii. 20. 2.

† Müller Strübing sticks at the whitewash. But lime for its preparation was at hand on the spot in the shape of the rock of which Kithæron is composed.

‡ Thuc. iii. 21.

§ 1b. iii. 22. 2.

NOTE 1.

On p. 68, in the second sentence of the last paragraph, I have used the following words:—‘This would account for the fact of all trace of the ditches having been lost. Otherwise they would have been cut in the solid rock, a difficult work, traces of which would probably be discernible at the present time.’ My view on the question, on further consideration, would be better expressed as follows:—‘This might partially account for the fact of all traces of the ditches having been lost. If they were carried over this part of the ground, they must have been cut in the solid rock, save where they passed over the mound, and if they were so cut, the fact might possibly be discovered by excavation at the present day.’

NOTE 2.

In printing the larger map, the corner on which the site of the Persian camp was indicated has been used for the smaller map of Leuctra.

G. B. G.

defend it.” Their numbers were now so reduced that the fact is not surprising. It would be hardly conceivable that some two hundred and fifty men would be able to defend about 700 yards of wall, more or less. They surrendered and were put to death, to the number of not less than two hundred, together with twenty-five Athenians. We thus arrive at the approximate number of those who perished in the actual course of the siege, before the surrender took place.

Number of original garrison, Platæans	400
Athenians	80
	—
	480
Number of those who escaped	212
“ , “ who were executed	225
	—
	437

* Thuc. iii. 22. 3.

† Ib. iii. 23. 4.

‡ Ib. iii. 52. 2.

> This leaves forty-three as the total of the casualties in the course of the actual defence.

When the incidents of the scene as related by Thucydides are considered, the comparative smallness of the latter number is in no wise extraordinary. We have no mention whatever of any hand to hand fighting.

The surrender of the city to the Thebans, its utter destruction, and the building of the inn near the Heræum, I have already touched upon.

Before bringing this paper to a close, I must say a few words in support of the objection I have raised as to the possibility of the city, whose siege is described by Thucydides, having stood on the southern or higher portion of the site: in other words, I do not wish this side of the question to be disposed of by a general statement as to its impossibility.

Let me first recall to the mind of the reader the topography of that part of the ground. The city standing there would have been of triangular shape, with a base on the north front, and an apex to the south. No discovery has been made which shows in any way where the northern wall of the city on this part of the ground stood. We may conjecture, however, that it lay lower down than the higher cross wall, since, had it been outside or south of that wall, we should probably have remains or traces of it existent at the present day. As I have already said, the existence of the traces of the wall of the first period at the extreme south point of the site is probably due to the fact that it lay without the area of the town of the second and third periods, and was not consequently pulled down in order that a more substantial wall might be built along its line. The total circumference of the town, taking the north wall of it to have stood at the highest point, we can fairly conjecture would have been a little over a mile. But this is not the only point. The only portion of this wall which would be so strengthened by natural position as not to be open to assault by the Peloponnesian force, would be a small part on the west side. We are there faced with the difficulty of accounting for the defence of a wall certainly more than three quarters, and probably one mile in length, by four hundred and eighty men against an immeasurably superior force.

> The whole of the east side might have been attacked by the mound, and, considering the numbers of the Peloponnesian force, the north side also, at the same time. There would have been no long portage for the earth required for the mound on the east

side, and consequently the fact of the Platæans being able to sensibly affect the completion of it would be quite inexplicable. The addition of eighty men by the Athenians to the garrison of a place of this kind would have been simply the addition of eighty victims to a certain disaster in case of a siege by the Peloponnesian force, a contingency which must have suggested itself to Athens in view of the position of the town just outside the Attic border. Such, then, are the main objections to this position as having been the scene of the siege; to me, at least, they seemed, on viewing the ground, to be conclusive.

One word before I close. My object in this special part of the work I have hitherto done in Bœotia was to attempt to test a prominent portion of the narrative of Thucydides, in the same way that Herodotus may be tested, on the same ground. I am well aware that the similarity in the results of the two tests as applied by me may be ascribed to a youthful, but not very discriminating, enthusiasm on behalf of the two authors. Yet I can say honestly, and without reserve, in both cases, that before I examined the ground, I did not expect to be able to trace much that could confirm their relation of events, and I was fully prepared to find much that would render their respective accounts open to suspicion of serious inaccuracy. Whether I did find this or not, will be best seen from what I have said in my two reports on the Battle and Siege of Platæa respectively. I cannot discover actual or obvious misstatements in either the account of Herodotus or that of Thucydides. Obvious omissions there are, a fact that might be easily noticed by any thoughtful reader without having seen the ground at all.

Very possibly the tests I have applied in the two cases may be considered unsatisfactory. Yet I think that, in the present state of our knowledge, they are the only form of test which can be applied, nor do I see clearly any immediate prospect of our acquiring further topographical data on which to found further test. I have not the slightest doubt that further excavation on the site of Platæa would well repay the expense of it, but the outlay would be great. If only our British School of Archæology were treated by our government in the same generous spirit in which the French government treat their national school, this, and much else beside, might be done. To recur again to the tests applied, I venture to think that though the fact of one or more of the strange incidents which Thucydides recounts, coinciding

with the topography of the ground, would not be at all a satisfactory guarantee of the genuine character of his narrative; yet the fact that *all* the incidents, without exception, can be accounted for on the ground establishes a very strong presumption as to the truth of it,—a presumption strengthened, I think, by the internal evidence of Thucydides' unacquaintance with the scene of the events.

III.—THE FIELD OF LEUCTRA.

The well-known difficulties with regard to the accounts we possess of the battle of Leuctra are not of such a character as to admit of any solution by examination of the topography of the field. In that respect, therefore, the ground is not so interesting as in the case of Platæa. The positions, however, which the two armies took up upon it are recognisable at the present day, with a certainty which is quite exceptional, I think, in the case of battles of such ancient date. This certainty is due to the fact that the ground whereon the great Theban phalanx stood before descending into the plain was marked immediately after the battle by the erection of an artificial mound, and the formation of a platform of earth in front of it. The original plan which I made of the ground was on a scale of 8 inches to the mile, with contour lines at a distance of 5 yards, vertical from one another. The plan, as printed, is on half that scale. The map is of irregular shape at the south-east corner, because I wished to include, in it the hill, which I have called the Grey Hill, in order to show that it is of such a character, with respect to slope, etc., as to render it highly improbable that the Spartan right took up its position upon it.

The field, as will be seen from the map, is a practically level plain, of an alluvial character, from half to three-quarters of a mile broad, with a line of hills at either side of it. Through the plain flows the head stream of the Asopus, here no more than a small brook. The road, or track, from the head of the Corinthian Gulf crosses the plain, coming down the slope of the southern hills through the modern village of Parapungia, and ascends the northern line of hills, through a small valley between the hillock whereon stood the Theban trophy, and the neighbouring hillock on the west of it. In the valley between these two hillocks is a well, or fountain, giving a copious supply of water, whose sides

General description of the field.

are built up with marble blocks taken, in all probability, from the neighbouring trophy just mentioned. About 100 or 150 yards or so after passing the well this Thebes road is cut almost at right angles by the track from Thespiae to Platæa. This latter track passes into the Asopus valley east of the east border of my map, and there are evidences of its having been, at some former date, paved in parts at any rate.

It was for the passage of this Thebes road that the battle took place. It is not my intention, however, to describe the battle with all the details obtainable from the various ancient authorities. I shall merely take that part of the detail which is of import in view of the purpose in hand, viz., the topography of the site. The strategy of Cleombrotus in his march to the field is instructive. The beginning of hostilities found him in Phocis. To reach Thebes from Phocis, the natural line of march would be along the west side of Lake Copais, between its shores and the eastern foot of Mount Helicon. It is perhaps hardly necessary to point out that the key to the strategical geography of Boeotia lies in the fact that an army invading from the north is obliged, by the nature of the country on the east side of Copais, to pass along the west shore of that lake, along, *i.e.*, that narrow strip of land between the foot of Helicon and the lake. Enlarging this fact, we may say that any power not possessing a command of the sea, which invades S. Boeotia, Attica, or the Peloponnese from the north is obliged to traverse this exceedingly narrow passage. To this fact, and to this alone, I apprehend, is due the circumstance that Boeotia has been *par excellence* the battle-ground of Greece, even as North Italy has been the battle-ground of Southern Europe. The circumstances of ground are similar in both cases. In North Italy the marshes of the lower Po, in Boeotia the marshy lake Copais, leaves but a narrow passage, bordered on the west, in one case, by the Apennines, in the other by Helicon. Coronea, Chæronea, and Orchomenus, scenes of many decisive battles lay in this passage, and it was to Coronea that Epaminondas led the Theban army when news of Cleombrotus' march arrived.* I have spoken of this as the only passage, but there was, as we know, another, but one which, from its extreme difficulty, was rarely used. Those who have come from Livadia over Helicon by the valley of the Muses have traversed it. It is a passage which a handful of men might defend against an army in many places. How unlikely it was for an army to attempt to cross it we may judge

* Paus. ix. 13. 3.

from the fact that Epaminondas detached an inadequate force to defend it, as events proved, and Cleombrotus' passage of it seems to have surprised the Thebans as much as Napoleon's passage of the Alps surprised the Austrians in North Italy.

After taking Creusis and the Theban triremes there, Cleombrotus marched along the road which leads to Thebes from the head of the Corinthian Gulf, not meeting with any opposition until, when, on reaching the summit of the ridge whereon stands the modern Parapungia, he found himself confronted by the Boeotian force on the opposite hill.

The hills whereon the Theban force was placed are low rounded hills, covered at the present day by plough land to their summits. The Theban phalanx was undoubtedly placed on the hill which I have called the Mound Hill, since it is on this hill alone that we have plain evidence of the work of man, in the shape of the Theban trophy. The work, too, must have been considerable, sufficient to alter the whole contour of the hill. On the highest part of it a mound has been raised, by taking away earth from the south slope, and so forming, in place of the pre-existing gradual incline, a platform of considerable extent, whose northern edge slopes abruptly to the level of the plain between the hills. This, then, must have been the Theban left. Their centre was probably on the Well Hill, as I have called it, and their right may well have extended as far as the Third Hill in the line. The position was one of considerable strength, but not comparable in this respect with that of the Spartans and their allies on the opposite side of the valley.


The hills whereon the Spartans stood are higher than those which face them, and their slope towards the plain is much more steep. The Spartans on the right of their line must have been opposite to the Thebans, which would point to the Grey Slope Hill as having been the position on which they stood.

I do not think that their right wing can have been further east, because the next hill, whose summit I have purposely included in my map, is so steep on its northern face, that any troops placed upon it would be standing on a slope like the roof of a house. Furthermore they would have been separated from the rest of the army by a very deep and precipitous ravine. The right was then, I take it, on the Grey Slope Hill. I have so named this hill, at the risk even of its being confounded with the Grey Hill, because it abuts on the plain along its north front in a steep slope of grey rock, which considerably adds to the natural strength

of the position, and which would immediately attract the notice of anyone examining the ground. The Spartan left, I take it, must have extended on to, and possibly beyond, the Bastion Hill whereon stands the east end of the modern Parapungia. The whole Spartan force, we are told, only amounted to about eleven thousand men, and their front cannot have been very much over $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile in length. The Spartan camp stood probably on the north face of the Grey Slope Hill, and anyone who has seen the ground will have little difficulty in understanding the unwillingness of the Theban commanders to attempt its assault, even after the victory they had won in the plain. It may be judged, even from the map herewith, how strong such a position would be by nature. The camp does not, from the words of Xenophon, appear to have been on the actual summit of the hill. He says of it,* *ἵν μέντοι οὐ πάντα ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὄρθιῷ μᾶλλον τι τὸ στρατόπεδον.* He says further on, that on Jason of Phœbœ arriving in the Theban camp, the latter proposed to him that he should attack it, *ἄνωθεν σὺν τῷ ξενίῳ*, while they attacked it in front. I fancy, therefore, that the camp came down to the upper edge of the grey rocky slope of which I have spoken. The purely topographical details in the various accounts of the battle are very meagre, and were it not for the existence of the artificial mound and platform there would have been considerable difficulty in determining the exact site of the field at all. The existence of that mound, however, together with the agreement of the rest of the ground with the incidents of the battle, enables us to understand, with all but absolute certainty, the positions of the various component parts of the two armies.

This completes the report of the work I have so far been able to accomplish. I only wish I had been able to accomplish more. Had the weather been more favourable, the work would have proceeded more rapidly, and I could have gone on to Coronea, Chæronea, and Orchomenus. I intend, all well, to make another visit to the country, so soon as time and money will allow, when I hope not only to take plans of those fields, but also to examine the great passage which leads into Bœotia from the north. Delium also remains to be done, and much more also, but the points I have mentioned are those which have a peculiar interest for me.


* Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 14.



Published by

F. S. Weller, lith.






Published by the Royal Geographical Society, 1888.

Turner & Shawe, 42 Brewer Street, London, W.

n. extenuation of AEGEUS river 1:


Map
SHOWING WHOLE OF
SITE OF PLATÆA

Scale 1:7920 or 8 inches-1 mile











W
~~10~~

H
~~18~~
~~13~~
~~8~~
~~2~~
~~20~~
~~17~~
~~11~~
~~21~~
~~19~~